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ABSTRACT
Title of the Dissertation : Investigation on the Possible Causes of Declining Dry
Cargo Throughput at Dar-Es-Salaam Port.
Degree

: MSc in Port Management

Dry Cargo Throughput at the port of Dar-Es-Salaam is declining. Two reasons were
thought to be the possible reasons for the decline. One, poor quality of service at the
port. Hence, customers are shifting to other ports particularly, Mombasa and Durban.
Second, the ability of the port’s hinterland to generate dry cargo is declining.
The research intended at examining these two reasons in order to find out whether,
they are actually the causes of the declining dry cargo throughput at the port of DarEs-Salaam or not.
Facts about the port’s quality of service and its hinterland’s ability to generate dry
cargo were collected and analysed. After doing the analysis, the following have been
found out:
1. The quality of service at Dar-Es-Salaam port is poor. It is more or less the same to
the quality of service at Mombasa port. The quality of service at the port of
Durban is much better than, the quality of service at Dar-Es-Salaam port.
2. Dar-Es-Salaam port is not losing cargo to Mombasa port.
3. Dry cargo throughput at Dar-Es-Salaam port is declining because one, the port is
losing cargo to the port of Durban and two, most of its hinterland ability to
generate dry cargo is declining.
Various ways for improving the quality of service, maintaining the port’s market
share and attracting more dry cargo towards the port have been recommended.
KEYWORDS: Investigation, Analysis, Quality of service, Dry cargo generation,
Decline, Improve.
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CHAPTER ONE
OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION AND DAR-ES-SALAAM PORT
1.1 Introduction
This dissertation was written in order to satisfy one of the requirements of the Master
of Science (MSc.) in Port Management, at the World Maritime University. It is
comprised of five chapters, namely:
i.

Introduction.

This part is divided into two main sub-parts including an overview about the
Dissertation and an overview on the port of Dar-Es-Salaam (DSM). The overview
about the research explains the problem and objectives of the research, research
methodology, significance of the research and its scope and limitations. The
introduction about the port gives a general view of the port.
ii.

Literature review.

It is divided into two parts too including theoretical literature review and, empirical
literature review. The theoretical literature provides a general information on ports
especially that, which is related to the factors that affect ports performance and
throughput in general, as explained in different available written literature.

The

empirical literature explains the experience of some ports in the world on the factors
which, they identify as of prime importance for improving the competitiveness of
ports, performance in general and cargo throughput in particular.
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iii.

Performance of Dar-Es-Salaam port.

In this part, data and facts on the performance of the port, particulary those showing
the quality of service including: productivity, ship time in port and cargo dwell time
are presented and analysed. Explanation on security of cargo and customer service
is given too.
vi.

Traffic generation by the hinterland of Dar-Es-Salaam port.

Under this part, facts and data on the volume of cargo generated by the port’s
hinterland are presented.

The possible factors which affect the port’s hinterland

ability to produce more dry cargo are also presented and analysed.
v.

Conclusion and recommendations.

This part gives a summary on the findings of the research.

Recommendations on

how to solve the identified problems are also given.
1.2 Overview of the Dissertation
1.2.1 Statement of the Problem and Problem Background
The problem of the research is, declining dry cargo throughput at Dar-Es-Salaam
Port. This probem is indicated in Table 1 and Figure 1 on page 3.
From Table 1 and Figure 1, it can be seen that, the growth of dry cargo throughput
has been fluctuating.

Between 1991 and 1992 and between1992 and 1993, the

throughput increased by 23.8% and 4.6% respectively.

In 1994, it dicreased by

15.6%. In 1995 and 1997, it increased by 0.7% and 10.2% respectively. In 1996, it
dicreased by 20.1% and in 1998, it dicreased by 0.9%. The average growth rate is
0.3%. The throughput in the last three years is lower than that of 1991.

2

The highest volume of traffic was achieved in 1993 followed by 1992. From 1994
to 1998, the throughput was less than that of 1993 and 1992. For example, in 1998,
Table 1.

Dry Cargo Throughput at Dar-Es-Salaam Port (In metric tonnes)

Years

Imports

Exports

Total

1991

1.028.091

866.169

1.894.260

1992

1.516.017

829.775

2.345.792

23.8

1993

1.567.666

885.317

2.452.983

4.6

1994

1.370.053

701.054

2.071.107

-15.6

-15.6

1995

1.347.535

736.977

2.084.512

0.7

-15.0

1996

969.107

696.792

1.665.899

-20.1

-32.1

1997

1.292.483

543.794

1.836.277

10.2

-25.1

1998

1.290.262

529.424

1.819.686

-0.9

-25.8

Average

1.297.659

723.663

2.021.315

0.3

22.7

(1) Yearly changes .

%ge Change 1

%ge Change 2

(2) Changes from 1993.

Source: DSM Port Statistics Department

Dry Cargo Throughput at Dar-Es-Salaam Port
Tons
3000000
2500000
2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
0
1991

1992

1993

Imports

1994

1995

Exports

1996

1997

1998

Total

Figure 1.
the throughput handled was 25.7% less than that of 1993. From 1996 to 1998, the
port handled less throughput than the throughput it handled in 1991. In 1998, the
throuput was 3.9%less than in 1991. Due to this fact, despite the fact that, the
average growth rate of dry cargo is 0.3%, it is said that, dry cargo throughput is
declining.
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1.2.2

Objectives of the Research

The objectives of the research were:
i.

To show the trend of dry cargo throughput at the port of Dar-Es-Salaam from
1991 to 1998

ii.

To identify the possible factors affecting the growth of the volume of dry
cargo through the port.

iii.

To examine the quality of service at the port and analyse it.

iv.

To examine the port’s hinterland ability to generate dry cargo and to identify
the possible factors which, affect the port’s hinterland ability to generate dry
cargo.

v.

To make recommendations on how to improve the factors that affect the
throughput so that, more cargo can be attracted to pass through the port.

1.2.3

Study Methodology

Under this, methods for data /information collection and analysis are explained.
1.2.3.1 Data Collection
Secondary data and information was collected from the port. The data and
information collected was on the performance of the port particularly, the
performance concerning the quality of service and dry cargo throughput. Also
information on the market problems and marketing strategies was collected.
Questions were prepared (see Appendix A) and sent to relevant port officials before
meeting and having discussions with them. The questions were for enabling the
officials to prepare the required information, to ensure that, important issues were not
overlooked and they were for provoking discussions. The information on the port’s
performance was collected from the Principal Statistics Officer while that, on the
marketing was collected from the Senior Marketing Officer. Also, information on
the dry cargo throughput at the main Dar-Es-Salaam port’s competitors that is,
Mombasa port in Kenya and Durban port in South Africa was collected from
Internet, annual reports of the ports and port magazines. The information collected
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about the three ports include ship-turn round time, cargo dwell time, delay time,
productivity, equipments and cargo security.

Information about customer service,

market problems and marketing strategies was also collected for Dar-Es-Salaam port.
Different written sources including books and handouts were consulted for
theoretical literature review.

Information for the empirical literature review was

collected from ports’ magazines, internet, lecture handouts and notes on particular
ports.
1.2.3.2 Methods of Analysis
Two factors were thought to be the possible causes for the declining dry cargo
throughput. These factors are one, poor quality of service and two, port’s hinterland
inability to produce adequate quantity of dry cargo. The research aimed at proving
whether these two factors are actually the ones that, cause the throughput to decline
or not.
The performance of the port in terms of productivity, container dwell time, vessel
time in port and security of cargo is measured by comparing it with the performance
of other ports in other countries and with the International Standards. The ability of
the hinterland to generate cargo which, can pass through the port is analysed by
looking at the

economic development of Tanzania and that of the landlocked

countries which pass their cargo through the port. If the economic development is
poor, it is concluded that, it is one of the causes for the declining cargo throughput.
It is also analysed by looking at the total dry cargo throughput at the main competing
ports that is, DSM, Mombasa and Durban. If the throughput at these ports is also
not increasing, it is concluded that, the hinterland’s ability to generate dry cargo is
poor. If the traffic at the competing port(s) is increasing, it is concluded that, some
shippers have decided to use the other port(s) instead of the port of Dar-Es-Salaam
because, the quality of service provided at the port of is poor. In case the total dry
cargo traffic is increasing, it is concluded that, the hinterland’s ability to generate
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cargo is growing.

The throughput at Dar-Es-Salaam port is not growing because,

the port is not competitive.

In additional to these, various factors which affect the

hinterland’s ability to produce adequate cargo are examined.
1.2.4

Significance of the Study

The significance of the study is that, the declining cargo throughput at the port is a
threat to the port’s and the Government’s revenue prospects and to the country’s
general economic development. Also, failure by the port to handle adequate amount
of cargo leads to under utilisation of its facilities.

For example, it utilises only

50.2% of dry cargo annual capacity while, the recommended utilisation is 60%
(Horck, J.

2000).

Its average berth occupancy is only 52.2%

while, the

recommended berth occupancy for eight berths and above is 78% (Francou, B.
2000). As a result of this, the port will either generate less revenue or incur losses.
Due to this, the Government will get less revenue or no revenue at all.
Consequently, it will fail to fulfil its obligations.The recommendations which are
given in this dissertation, will certainly help to improve the situation.
1.2.5

Scope and Limitations

The research covers a period from 1991 to 1998.

It considers only dry cargo

throughput which, includes general cargo and containerised cargo. There are many
factors which affect cargo throughput in ports, this dissertation has analysed only the
quality of service factors and the hinterland’s ability to generate dry cargo.

This

dissertation would have been better if transit dry cargo through the port of Durban to
Zambia, Malawi and other countries was obtained. Despite of the efforts made by
Haluod L. of Durban port to provide me with the data, the specific type of data which
was required, was not obtained.

It was also not possible to get detailed data on the

throughput of each type of dry cargo at each of the three ports. The data would have
indicated which cargo in particular, its volume is declining at Dar-Es-Salaam port
and whether, it is increasing at the other ports or not.
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1.3

Overview of Dar-Es-Salaam Port

Dar-Es-Salaam port is one among three main ports which are under the
Tanzania Harbours Authority (THA). The other ports are Tanga and Mtwara.

The

port of is the largest and the most important among the ports. It handles about 90%
of the total traffic through the three ports (THA Corporate Plan 1996/7-2000/01).
The Tanzania Harbours Authority is a parastatal organisation.

It manages and

operates the ports on behalf of the Government which is the owner of the ports. The
Mission of the organisation is ``to be the gateway for the Eastern, Central and South
Africa International trade, totally dedicated to providing and facilitating quality,
value added, competitive and profitable ports and state of the art technology and
highly motivated workforce’’ (THA Annual Report, 1997/1998).

The objectives of

the port are as follows:
•

To provide facilities and operate a co-ordinated system of harbours in
accordance with the provision of the Act establishing it.

•

To provide facilities relating to harbours services and services ancillary
thereof.

•

To act as warehousemen and store goods whether or not the goods have
been or are to be handled as cargo by the Authority.

The port of Dar-Es-Salaam has three dry cargo terminals which are as follows:
1. General Cargo Terminal
This Terminal has eight berths for handling general dry cargo Vessels. They have
a length of 1.464 m. It has a shed measuring 81.040 m2. It also has an open storage
area of 52.440 m.

Its capacity is to handle 2.5 Million tons of general cargo per

year. Cargo handling equipment at this terminal is shown in Table 2.
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Table 2.

Equipment at General Cargo Terminal

Equipment Type

Capacity-Tons

Forklifts

Quantity

2.5 to 3.5

81

”

5

16

”

10

1

Tractors

N/A

48

Trailes

N/A

79

Vacuvators

N/A

6

Grabs

N/A

29

Source: THA Corporate Strategy (1996/97-2000/2001)

2. Container Terminal
This Terminal covers a total lenght of 540 m. It is comprised of three berths. The
depth of its berths is 12.2 m. The stacking capacity within the port is 3000 TEUs
and 54 TEUs for reefers.
There is an inland container depot located at Kurasini, about two Km away from the
port. This has a shed of 16.000 m2 capacity. It has an open stacking area which can
stack 800 TEUs. The total terminal’s annual capacity is 120.000 TEUs, equivalent
to 1.5 million tons. The terminal cargo handling equipment is shown in Table 3.
Table 3.

Container Terminal Equipment

Equipment Type

Capacity (Tons)

Quantity

SSG

35.6

3

RTGs

36.5

8

RMG

36.5

1

Loaders

42.0

13

Mobile Cranes

5 to 25

37

Forklifts

2.5 to 9

76

Empty Handles

13 to 16

18

Trailers

40.0

116

Trailers

5 to 25

42

Tractors

30.0

66

Source: THA Corporate Strategy (1996/97-2000/2001)
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3. Grain Terminal
Bulk cargo such as maize, wheat and fertilizer are handled at the grain terminal
which has fully automated silos. Other facilities at this terminal include three
bagging units and a fleet of ten Dump Trucks. The Silos have a capacity to store up
to 30.000 tons of grain at any time.
Its entrance channel is 13 m at high tide and 140 m width since 1998.

It allows

ships of maximum length of 234 m at any time of the day. It operates from Monday
to Friday, day shift 0700- 1500 and afternoon shift is between 15:00- 23:00 (normal
working hours) and night shift from 23:00- 07:00, Saturdays, Sundays and Public
holidays (over time). On average, 713 dry cargo deep sea vessels call at the port
annually. In 1998, 801 ships called at the port.
The port serves Tanzania as well as land locked Countries including: Zambia,
Malawi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda.
The last four countries are sometimes referred to as the Great Lakes Countries.
Major imports through the port are; machinery, rolling stock, petroleum and its
products, fertiliser, chemicals, grain and a large variety of industrial and consumer
goods. Export tonnage is mainly made up of coffee, cotton, copper, tea and tobacco.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
As explained in chapter one, this chapter is divided into two main parts, theoretical
and empirical literature. The aim of having this part was to enable the researcher and
author as well as readers of this dissertation, to get a general knowledge from the
available literature and to get experiences of other ports on the various factors which,
can affect ports’ performance particularly, ports’ throughput. It also helps to show a
clear picture on the position of the port of Dar-Es-Salaam, as far as performance on
the provision of service is concerned by looking at what other ports do. The aim was
also to find out possible methods of improvement from some of the available
literature. The knowledge is useful for recommending on what should be done, in
order to improve the performance and consequentlly, the throughput at Dar-EsSalaam port.
2.2 Theoretical Literature Review
Theoretical literature review is explained under five sections including meaning and
evolution of ports, ports as sub-systems of the transport system, factors for choice of
ports, types of management of ports, and importance of ports in economic
development.
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2.2.1

Meaning and Evolution of Ports

A port is a harbour having facilities for ships to moor and load or discharge. A port
is sometimes referred to as ship/shore interface or a Maritime intermodal interface
Alderton (1995, p. 253). Ports have to change over time due to the following factors:
• The development and improvement of overland transport which can lead to a
need for a port to be bigger.
• Changes in trade patterns which can affect a port either negatively or positively.
• Changes in financial and logistics thinking. A port can become an Industrial
area/ a marketing and distributuon centre.
• Changes in ship size with need for more water in the docks and approaches and
the associated need for faster cargo handling equipment that leads to shorter
ship turn-round times.
Due to a need for changes to take place in ports, ports have been changing from one
generation to another as shown in Table 4 .
Table 4.

Evolution of Ports

First Generation:
Before 1960

Main cargo: break-bulk
Attitude: conservative
Development strategy: changing point of Transport mode
Decesive factors: labour and capital
Scope of activities: loading/offloading of Cargo
Second
Main cargo: brak-bulk,dry/liquid bulk
Generation:
Attitude: expansionist
After 1960’s
Development strategy: transport, industrial and Commercial
centre
Decesive factor: Capital
Scope of activities:
-cargo transformation,
-ship-related industry,
-commercial services and
-enlarged port area
Third Generation: Main cargo: bulk and unitised, containerised
After 1980’s
Attitude: commercially oriented
Development strategy: intergrated transport node & logistic
centre
Decesive factor: technology and know-how
Scope of activities: in addition to the previous ones
-Cargo information and distribution
-Logistics activities
-Terminals and distribelt on landslide
Source: Port Marketing & the challenges of the 3rd Generation Port-UNCTAD Report,
1990. In Alderton, M. P. (1995. P. 258).
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With changes taking place in ports, ports are not only what the traditional definitions
of a port mean. Currently, ports are also industrial and distribution centres with
advanced information technology.
2.2.2

Ports as Sub-systems of the Transport System

Ports are part of the International Transport System which includes port, shipping,
land journey (which could be lorry, train, pipeline, conveyor), storage and goods
handling at loading and discharging ports. As Stopford (1997) said, a transport
system is a transport operation which has been designed so that, the different parts of
the system link together as efficiently as possible. Like any other system and its
parts, if any part of the transport system is not functioning efficiently, it will
negatively affect the other parts and the whole system. The aim of the system is to
move cargo as efficiently as possible over the whole distance from origin to
destination. If this aim is achieved, more business can be won. Some of the ways
for achieving this are :
i.

To make cargo handling operation more efficient by use of high productivity
handling equipment.

ii.

Intergration of transport where each component is designed to fit in with the
others.

iii.

Provision of good service which includes frequent service, reliable,
advanced information about vessel arrival and departure times, speed and
security/safety of cargo.

Reliability has become very important due to

growing importance of just-in-time supply of stock.

Stopford (1997, pp.

11, 294-296) said, some shippers may be prepared to pay more for a service
which is guaranteed to operate to time and provide the service which is
promised.
2.2.3 Factors Affecting Choice of Port
Lodder, (1997) pointed out the following to be the factors influencing the choice of
a port:
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• Location
• Potential traffic base
• Connectivity (multi-modal)
• Terminal-Port efficiency
• Financial considerations
• Legal / Institutional factors
• Nautical approach
According to Grimwade, (1989), Cost of transport, speed, reliability, safety/security
of cargo are the main important factors in the choice of the means of transport,
transport operators and routes.

Failure to provide good service may result into loss

of customers especially where there is competition. Under competition, ports are
supposed to be innovative, thinking of various ways on how to improve efficiency
and service provision so that, customers can be attracted. Alderton (1995, p.

262)

pointed out that, ports now have to compete for cargo very much than in the past,
hence, great efficiency and value added activities (like cargo consolidation,
distribution centre, crating, weighing, repacking, etc.) are needed.

Brian and

Roach (1995) have indicated that, if an adequate stock of the right type of
equipment is not provided, cargo handling rate will be low. Shipowners may
bypass the port or leave older ships on those routes. According to Taylor (1985),
fundamentally a port grows by virtue of the trade it can attract and maintain. To be
able to do this, provision of services which can meet customers’ needs is important.
Currently, customer relations management (CRM) is also considered to be a very
important marketing strategy in this era of globalisation and severe competion.
Gray, (2000) said, ``the success of the organisation do not only depend on the
quality of customer service offered, but also on the relationship with shippers.
Forging a stable relationship with a customer can play an important part in
establishing competitive advantage’’.

CRM requires organisations to intergrate

and link their most important customers to their information systems and dealing
with individual customers’ needs, knowing his business and being able to help and
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solve his problems. The Swedish Ports’ and Stevedores’ Association (2000)
emphasized that, ``it is absolutely vital that, ports improve their efficiency and
productivity in order to keep or hopefuly, regain shares. It is a well known fact that,
the bottleneck of sea transport is the port, where goods have to be loaded or
discharged’’.

For a port to be successful, both players at the port as well as the

Government have to play well their roles. The promotion contenders said, the
promotion role played by Governments can have a direct bearing on the success of
those in the port related industries (Promotional contenders, 9/10 1999).
2.2.4 Types of Management of Ports
There are different types of management which ports can adapt. These types are
show in Table 5.
Table 5.

Port Management Options

Type
Infrastructure Superstructure Stevedoring labour Other functions
Landlord Port
public
private
private
public/public
Tool Port
public
public
private
public/private
Public Service Port
public
public
public
majority public
Private Service Port
private
private
private
majority private
Source: Port Management Models and Privatisation- Handout. Rotterdam. April, 2000.

A landlord port is owned by the public.

The public provides the infrastructure and

it leases the port to private people. The private companies provide their own
superstructre and deals with stevedoring activities. Other functions are done by
both the public and the private companies. Tool ports are owned by the public and
the public provides both the infrastructure and the superstructure. Stevedoring
activities are done by private stevedoring companies. Public service ports are
owned by the public and almost every thing is done by the public while, Private
service port are owned by private companies and almost every thing is done by
them.
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2.2.5

Importance of Ports in Economic Development

Transport is very important in the economic development of any country. Good
transport system acts as a catalyst for economic development. It boosts agriculture
and industrial production. As more and more economic activities are
created/expand, more and more transport development and expansion is required.
Generally, tranport development and economic development depend on each other.
Due to the existance of this kind of relationship between tranport and economic
development, it is said that, transport demand arises in order to satisfy other
demands. Without demand for transport, there will be no need for it.
The volume of demand for transport is determined by the level of economic
development. The level of economic development is measured by the rate of
growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Stopford (1997, p. 238) said, a
growth in GDP leads to increased demand for transport. A measure of economic
output is divided into nine different sectors including Agriculture, Mining and
Manufacturing. These are directly involved with trade, either through imports or
exports. Other sectors are Construction, Wholesale and Retail trade, Transport and
Communication and other services. Growth in these activities lead to growth in
demand for sea transport in this case. In order to boost economic growth, both
producers and Governments have to play their role.
Where there is no enough traffic, ships will not go. According to Taylor (1985) ,
ships change routes from where markets are unprofitable to elsewhere where more
and newer raw materials become available and financial investiment in the
economy of developing countries has enabled them to compete and require goods
and equipment to support their economic progression.
Efficient ports contribute towards building a country’s economy.

If a port is

efficient, it will attract more ships and cargo thus, enable the Government to get
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adequate revenue and, the port will have a higher contribution to the country’s
GNP. Also, if the port is efficient, importers can import and sell at cheaper prices
which can be affordable by the majotity of people. Cheap prices will help to
improve peoples living standard. Brian and Roach (1995, p. 8) said, if a port is
inefficient, older ships will go to that route as a result.

Shippers will not be able to

obtain competitive freight rates, the country’s imports will be more expensive than
they should be and its exports will be uncompetitive as they enter international
seaborne trade.
From this literature review, among the things which have been learnt are that, if
the quality of services provided at a port are not good and if, there is poor economic
development which leads to inavailablity of enough traffic, ship owners and
shippers will change routes. Basing on these, it was thought that, possibly, services
which are provided at Dar-Es-Salaam port are not good hence, ship owners and
shippers have decided to go to the ports which compete with DSM port. It was
also thought that, the economic development of its hinterland is not good too,
hence, its ability to generate enough traffic is negatively affected. These factors
among others, have lead to declining dry cargo throughput at Dar-Es-Salaam port.
The research intended at proving whether these assumptions are true or not.
2.3 Empirical Literature Review
As explained earlier, this section explains experience from other ports on the factors
which they identify as factors affecting cargo throughput/success factors.

It also

explains the strategies they use for being competitive in the market and thus, being
able to maintain or attract more cargo throughput.
2.3.1 The Port Authority of Algeciras Bay: This authority believes that, good
infrastructure and customer service are the foundation for keeping the port at the
forefront of other ports. Hence, they have a programme for service improvement
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ahead of customer needs and infrastructure improvement. They believe that, these
are two pillars to recover its leadership in the Mediterrenean, despite more and more
intensive competition in traffics (Puerto Bahia de’Algeciras, 15/11/98).
2.3.1

The Port of Århus: This port extensively uses EDI. With this equipment,

there is no physical movement of people. All information regarding vessel operation
that is, planning, arrival of vessel, order to load a vessel or a container, control,
reporting, rail operation, receiving and deliverying are communicated through
computer. Container movement and tracing is controlled by use of cameras and
computers. These equipment facilitate quick communication and improved security
of cargo.
The port has high capacity cranes. It has cranes which can handle 65 containers per
hour (loading and off-loading at the same time). Crane productivity is 35 TEUs per
hour. It has wheel stackers which can stack up to 60 containers per hour. Up to 101
containers pass through the gate per hour, this is the situation because, they have
automated gate system. All customers of the port are on the line every day. The port
identifies the following to be critical success factors:
 continuos running of computer and
 information system - equipment, know-how, innovation and procedures .
It has severe competion from the port of Hamburg hence, the Århus stevedoring
company try to optimise logistics and be more productive. Due to their efficiency,
the TEUs increase at 10% on average per year. The trend of general cargo is
decreasing (Nielson, V. Lecture, 2000).
2.3.3

The Port of Bremen: At this port it is said that, the advantageous of quality of

service in Bremerhaven are excellent competitive arguments. Another advantage is
fast hinterland traffic via rails and highways. A balanced ratio of imports and
exports is one of its stregths. This attracts shipping lines because, they can discharge
and load at the same time. The port has high productivity equipment like Jumbo
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cranes, Post panamax cranes with capacity of 75 tons and van carriers. These enable
the port to have productivity of 25 containers and 30 moves per hour. A ship stays at
the port for 8 to 16 hours (The BLG in Bremen and Bremerhaven, 1998).
2.3.4

The Port of Hamburg: This port is owned by the city of Hamburg but

operations are done by different private companies. The city provides infrastructure
while private operators at its different terminals provide the superstructure. The port
is well connected to its hinterland. There are feeder services, rail services overnight,
lorries and baltic ferries and barges. It has advanced equipment, uses computer
technology and highly qualified and experienced specialists (Port of Hamburg,
1998).
One of its container terminal operators-HHLA has the following equipments, RMG,
Automatic guided vehicles (AGV), straddle carriers,and front loaders. The terminals
productivity is 20 boxes per crane per hour. Productivity of DRMG with AGVs is
45 boxes per hour.

Hence, the average produtivity is about 30 containers per hour.

Container dwell time is 4 days ( Blauert, C. 2000). The port believes in training and
flexibility in the use of operators like of cranes and reduction of labour cost while,
increasing equipment utilisation as key factors for achievement of high productivity
and thus, to be able to be competitive. It is the most expensive port among eight
(from Hamburg- Le-havre range) competing ports, however, its throughput is
growing -see Table 6 (Rotterdam Annual Report,1998).
2.3.5

Malta Free Port Corporation: This port was a state owned port formed

under Corporations Act. Now, it is a company but still owned by the state. It
operates like any private company without interference of the government and
government bureaucracy is avoided. The port ensures a leading role in
containerisation industry by using various computerised systems aimed at enhancing
efficiency. Customers have access on an online basis which enables them to have on
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time information of the entire container handling cycle.

With this system, the

terminal realises the following benefits:
 increased gate productivity
 reduced truck turn-round time
 improved labour utilisation and productivity as it enhances data entry
 enhances container movements update, vessel shedules and on line allocation of
containers in the yard (Malta Free Port Magazine, 1999, p. 14).
It has different types of equipment for example, its terminal two has the following
equipment, five post panamax quay side cranes and ten RTG cranes. It uses multtrailer system to enhance flexibility whilst also guaranteeing fast movement of
containers between terminals. Productivity at the terminal is 18 moves per hour.
Between 1997 and 1998, TEUs increased by 62%.
The company believes in training and high personnel flexibility as essential and
important ingredients to achieve a more productive and efficient workforce. It also
believes in customer satisfaction as a key success factor. The port people attend user
group for shipping lines and container terminals meetings.
2.3.6

Malmö Port: At this port, flexibility in the use of labour is identified as key

factor for better utilisation of manpower too. At the port, dock workers are also crane
operators. Ships crew also do lashing of containers. Productivity is 25 boxes per
hour, 150 tons per hour per crane for bulk cargo and 12 tons per hour per gang for
pre-sling bagged cargo. Turn-round time for Bulk cargo ship (7000 tons) is 7 days,
for container ship is 4 hours, for a ship carrying sugar (5000 tons), it is 3 days
working hours.

On average, it handles 1222.3 tons per ship day. It provides 7 days

free stay of cargo at the port (Anderson, Malmö Port Traffic Operations Manager,
lecture notes, April 2000).
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2.3.7

The Port of Rotterdam: This port is owned by the Rotterdam Municipal

council and managed by the Rotterdam Municipal Port Management (RMPM). The
municipal provides infrastructure and leases land to private operators.

Private

operators provide the superstructure. The port has different types of advanced cargo
handling equipment including straddle carriers, RMGs and AGVs. There are 191
multipurpose cranes, 72 gantry cranes, 30 tugs and other types of equipment. It has
750 leasees (Crook, G. 2000). It recognises the importance of customer service
management, as a result of this, they have dedicated terminals to their most important
customers like Maersk Delta BV. At the port, it is said that, `` within an environment
characterised by globalisation, enlargement in scale and supply chain management,
intensified cooperation with both suppliers and purchasers is becoming an ever
important condition for maintaining or strengthening Rotterdam’s competitive
advantage’’.

The RMPM sees safe, smooth operations of shipping traffic and

provision of good facilities as key factors for success. The average productivity at
the port is 25 containers per hour. Its throughput is shown on table 6. Despite the
fact that, the port has a number of competitors, in 1997 and 1998, the throughput
increased by 6.2% and 1.5% respectively (Port of Rotterdam Annual Report, 1999).
Its transhipment is growing and it is expected to continue growing, its turnover is
expected to grow at 25%. This is because, the economy of its hinterland-Netherlands,
Germany and Poland is expected to grow positively. This shows a direct relationship
between the hinterland’s development and the port’s throughput development. It is
also said that, the centre of excellence for port throughput systems are product
innovation and research and development. ( Llyod’s Port Management, 9/10, 1999.
p. 38). Various industrial activities like, petro-chemical refinery, packaging and
distribution, metal recycling, plastic and rubber recycling are done at the port.
The customs at the port has an X-ray container scan. Before they had this scanner,
they used to check one container for four hours but now, the machine scans seventy
containers a day among which, about only ten containers are checked physically.
The scanner has a capacity to scan twenty containers per hour and when it works at
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its full speed, it can process five hundred containers per day (Port of Rotterdam,
December, 1999). Different activities at the port are remotely controlled and
communication is done through computers.
Table 6.

Throughput at the Ports of Rotterdam and some of its
Competing Ports (In million tonnes)

Years Hamburg Bremen Amsterdam Rotterdam Antwerp
1998
75.8
34.4
55.8
314.8
119.8
1997
76.7
34.0
56.5
310.1
111.9
1996
71.1
31.5
54.7
292.1
106.5
1995
72.1
31.2
50.3
293.4
108.1
1994
68.3
30.9
48.1
293.9
109.5

Le-Havre
66.4
59.7
56.2
53.8
54.4

Source: Rotterdam Municipal Port Management: Annual Report, 1998.

2.3.8

At Sea Malta Port Corporation: They believe that, efficiency which involve

reduction of cost and time is a key factor for success. In order to be able to satisfy
their customers, customers opinions are sought. Every employee fills complaints
from customers in customers’ complaints form for action to follow. Also, customers
and workers discuss together about the quality of service. They also believe that, the
main marketing tool is contact with the customer.
2.3.9

Weatherproof Cargo Handling Comapany at the Port of Amsterdam. At this

company, it is believed that, companies nowadays do not compete through pricing
but by the quality of service. They also believe in training of employees on the effect
of cargo damages as a key factor for success. In order to avoid delays due to bad
weather and thus, being able to provide quick vessel turn-round time, they have
covered their berth. This enables them to do loading and off-loading activities under
any kind of weather (Lecture notes from the company, 14/4/ 2000).
2.4 Summary
Both theoretical and empirical literature identify more or less the same key success
factors for being competitive, maintaining and attracting more throughput. The
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factors that are identified are as follows: high capacity cargo handling equipment,
provision of safe, smooth and efficient cargo handling services, provision of good
facilities tailored to the needs of the customers and ensuring the shortest ship turnround time, good and close relationship with customers and good quality of customer
service.

It has also been observed that, the quality and provision of timely service is

more important than cost.

Other factors are good infrastructure, use of EDI, use of

computers and cameras for container tracing, avoiding 100% physical checking of
cargo and use of container scanners for cargo checking and clearance, research and
development, innovation, training of employees and flexibility in the use of labour.
In additional to these, involvement of major customers in ports’ decision making and
quality control bodies, reducing labour utilisation while increasing equipment
utilisation, working without stopping due to bad weather and having advanced
information technology, industrial and distribution activities adds to a port’s
competitiveness. Further to these, it has been observed that, the development in
ports’ traffic throughput depends very much on the economic development of their
hinterlands. For a particular hinterland’s economy to be able to develop, both
producers and Governments have to play their role.
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CHAPTER THREE
QUALITY OF SERVICE AT DAR-ES-SALAAM PORT
3.1

Introduction

Port activities involve four main types of activities namely, ship operation, quay
transfer operation, storage operation and receipt/delivery operation. These operations
are interelated and interdependent. Failure to perform one of the operations as
desired may unfavourably affect the performance of other operations and as a result,
the performance of the port as a whole will be affected. Poor performance of these
operations also adversely affects the quality of service and customers satisfaction.
Hence, in order for a port to achieve desired or good performance, all these
operations have to be properly planned and implented. The performance of each of
these has to be measured in order to know whether it is good or not so that, if it is
good, ways for making it better can be thought of and if it is not satisfactory,
corrective measures can be found. Each of these operations has its performance
indicators as explained in the subsequent explanation.
3.1.1

The Ship Operation

This operation involves the following activities: preparing cargo in the hold and
hooking on the cargo, lifting the cargo to the quay, landing the cargo and unhooking
and returning the hook to the hold to take a new cargo lift. Performance indicators
for this kind of operation are:
•

Gang output: This indcates the amount of tonnes the gang can handle in one
hour.
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•

Ship working output: It indicates how many tonnes the whole ship is handling in
one hour.

•

Shift output: It indicates the weight transferred during one shift.

Ship working output and shift output can be also expressed in output per day, per
week, per month or per year. The output determines the length of time a ship can
stay at the port from its arrival up to its departure. This legth of time is known as
ship turn-round time.

Ship turn-round time is another performance indicator of ship

operation. To ship owners and shippers, time is very important. Ship owners would
like to have time in port for their ships to be as short as possible. Likewise, shippers
would like the ship operation to be as quick as possible so that, they can get their
cargo quickly. In case the operation is slow, they may look for a port with quicker
ship operations. The main factors that can affect the output are: the ship design, size
and equipment, type of cargo, weight, packaging and stowage, the number of men in
a gang and their skills, equipment and the management i,e. planning and control.
3.1.2

The Quay Transfer Operation

This operation links shipboard activities with the port’s storage areas. It is the task
concerned with moving cargo to either storage areas from the quay or from the quay
to onland means of transport. Performance indicators for this operation are:
•

Moves per hour: This indicates the number of cycles (from the ship to the quay
and back to the ship) a hook can perform per hour.

•

TEUs per hoThis performance indicator shows the number of containers a hook
can shift from the ship to the quay in one hour.

Performance of this operation is affected by number of equipment in a gang, the
weight they can carry, their speed, distance travelled and the number of men in a
gang.

This operation affects ship turn-round too.

hour, the shorter the time a ship will stay in port.
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The more the moves/TEUs per

The ship operation and quay transfer operation performance indicators are also
known as productivity indicators.
3.1.3

The Storage Operation

As the word storage implies, this operation deals with keeping goods in storage
facilities and taking care of them. There are two types of port storage including
transit and long term storages. Long term storage ranges between 2-3 years while
short term storage for transit is supposed to range between 2-4 weeks ( Horck, J.
2000). Some of the reasons for keeping cargo in transit storage are to accommodate
for the imbalance between the quantity of cargo carried by the ship and the number
of overland transport carrying units ready for inland transport and to allow for
administrative formalities to be done.

Another reason is to permit for cargo

consolidation. These reasons and others may lead to cargo staying in the transit
storage for more days than the preferred number of days if, they are not done in good
time. The period of time cargo stays in the transit storage is known as cargo dwell
time. Cargo dwell time is another measure of the level of customer service in ports.
The recommended cargo dwell time is 3 to 4 days (Horck, J. 2000).
3.1.4

The Receipt/ Delivery Operation

Receipt and delivery of cargo can either be direct or indirect. Indirect receipt and
delivery of cargo refers to receipt and delivery via a transit storage. Direct receipt
and delivery of cargo takes place on the quayside, under the hook. This delivery
alternative is affected by actions of individuals and organisations which are outside
the control of the port. These actions include onland tranport, customs and others
administrative procedures. These factors affect cargo dwell time too, if they are not
properly planned and if they are not done within a short time, cargo dwell time will
be longer than the desired time.

26

All the mentioned indicators are used for measuring the quality of service. The
quality of service means, suitability of a port and adequacy of its services to meet
customers needs. It is related to satisfaction of customers’ needs. In this chapter, the
performance of Dar-Es-Salaam port as far as the quality of service is concerned is
presented and analysed by using the indicators which include: TEUs per hour, tonnes
handled per shift per hour, tonnes handled per ship per day, ship turn-round time and
cargo dwell time. Cargo security and customer service are also discussed.
3.2

Performance Analysis

3.2.1

Productivity

It refers to the units of cargo handled per equipment, per gang shift and per ship
during a given unit period of time. Productivity at the port of DSM is shown in
Table 7. In 1991 and 1998, productivity in terms of TEUs was 9 TEUs per hour.

In

1996 and 1997, it was 12 TEUs per hour, it was the highest performance. The
average productivity per shift per hour is 11 TEUs. The objective of THA is to
handle 20 TEUs per hour.

The international standard is 25 TEUs per hour.

Comparing the ports performance with these, it can be seen that, the ports
performance is very low. It is half of the desired performance and lower than half of
the international standard.
Table 7.

Productivity at Dar-Es-Salaam Port and Mombasa Port

Dar-Es-Salaam Port
TEUs/Gang/
Tons/Gang/
Tons/Ship/
TEUs/Gang/
Hr
Shift
Day
Hr
1991
9.3
170.9
1.187.7
N/A
1992
9.0
195.8
1.225.7
N/A
1993
10.3
219.0
1.271.6
N/A
1994
10.8
204.9
1.210.2
N/A
1995
11.0
183.8
1.130.7
N/A
1996
12.0
215.5
1.198.9
N/A
1997
12.0
202.1
1.190.8
N/A
1998
9.4
210.0
1.195.0
5
Average
10.5
200.3
1.201.4
N/A
Sources: DSM Port Statistics. KPA 1994 and 1998 Annual Bulletins.
Year
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Mombasa Port
Tons/Gang/
Shift
203
213
221
230
253
257
247
250
234.3

Tons/Ship/
Day
1.626
1.542
1.775
1.703
1.354
1.795
1.807
1.614
1.652

The port’s productivity has also been compared with that of Mombasa, Durban and
some other ports in the world, Table 8 shows the comparison. Looking at this Table,
it can be seen that, in 1998, the port’s productivity in terms of TEUs per hour was
almost twice that of Mombasa port which is 5 TEUs per hour (East African, 29/5/00)
and, much below that of Durban port, that is, 14 TEUs per hour (Fairplay, 6/4/2000).
It is less than half of the performance of the other ports. Performance in terms of
tons per gang per shift and per ship day, Mombasa port has a higher productivity
than DSM port. It was 250 tons per gang per shift in 1998 and the average is 234.4
tons while, at DSM port it was 210 tons per gang per shift in 1998 and the average is
200.3 tons. The performance of DSM port in terms of tons per ship per day is 1201.4
tons on average and it was 1198.9 tons in 1998. At Mombasa port, it is 1652 tons per
day on average and it was 1614 tons in 1998. In some ports in developed countries,
productivity per ship per day is as follows: In Rotterdam port, it is 140.000 tons/day
(with 2x85 gantry cranes), at Amazonehaven, it is 50.000 tons/day (with 1 loader at
5000 tons/hour). Productivity in Amsterdam port, is 65,000 tons/day and at Zealand
Seaports, it is 60.000 tons/day (with 4x25 tons floating cranes) (Reji, 2000). The
international standard of productivity is 640 tons per shift per hour. Comparing
productivity at Dar-Es-Salaam port with productivity at these ports and with the
Table 8.

Comparison of Productivity at DSM port and that of other

Ports
Ports

Containers/crane/hr.

Tons/gang/shift

Tons/ship/day

Dar-Es-Salaam

9

210

1.198.9

Durban

14

Mombasa

5

250

1.614.0

Århus

35

Malmö

25

150

1.222.3

Malta Free Port

18

Hamburg

20

Rotterdam

25

140.000.0

Sources: DSM Port Statistcs, Fairplay, 6/4/00, East Africa, 29/5/00, Lecture notes
(for Århus, Malmo, Malta Free Port , Rotterdam and Hamburg).
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international standard, productivity at the port is very low. It is also lower than that,
at Mombasa port.
Some of the reasons for poor productivity are:
•

Inadequacy of cargo handling equipment

•

Power interuptions

•

Poor ship stowage

•

Dubble utilisation of equipment particularly the RTG and Front Loaders

•

Equipment break-down

•

Type of ships. Some of the ships calling at the port are old and not made for
quick and direct discharge.

3.2.2

Ship Time in Port

Ship time in port includes waiting and service time. The ratio of waiting time to
service time is another indicator of the quality of service at a port. The acceptable
ratio is 10%. A port with a higher ratio than this, is considered to be of poor quality
(Francou, B. 2000).
Table 9.
Years

Average Ship time in Port (Days/Ship) at DSM Port
Waiting

Service

Turn-Round

WT/ST

Time (WT)

Time (ST)

Time (TRT)

%

1991

0.1

4.9

5.0

2.0

1992

0.3

4.1

4.4

7.3

1993

0.2

4.0

4.2

5.0

1994

0.8

3.9

4.7

20.5

1995

0.5

4.1

4.6

12.2

1996

0.4

3.2

3.6

12.5

1997

0.5

3.5

4.0

14.3

1998

0.4

3.6

4.0

11.1

Average

0.4

3.9

4.3

10.6

Source: DSM Port Performance Statistics
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Waiting time at the port of Dar-Es-Salaam as indicated in Table 9 , is 0.4 day (about
10 hours) on average. In 1998, it was also 0.4 of a day. From 1991 to 1993, waiting
time to service time ratio was good, it was below the acceptable ratio. From 1994 to
1998, the performance deteriorated, it was above the acceptable ratio. In 1994, it
was the highest, it was 20.5%.

In 1998, the ratio was 11.1%, it was better than the

ratio from 1994 to 1997. On average, the ratio is 10.6%. This ratio is slightly higher
than the recommended one. Ship turn-round time at the port ranges from three to
five days. In 1998, it was 4 days. On average, the turn-round time is 4.3 days.
The situation at Mombasa port is as shown in Table 10. Waiting time at the port is
2.6 days on average. From 1991 to 1998, the percentage of waiting time to service
time is much higher than the acceptable ratio and the ratio at DSM port. The
smallest ratio was in 1991 and the highest rate was in 1997, it was 204.3%. On
average, it is 89.7%. In 1998, it was 46%.This situation indicates that, there is
congestion at the port. In Freight (August/September, 1998), it is said that, ``delays
at Mombasa port are encouraging more Ugandan shippers to move to alternative
soutern route. This is due to congestion at Mombasa port’’. In 1998, turn-round
time was 4.3 days.
Table 10.

Ship Time in Port at Mombasa Port

Year

Waiting Time

Service Time

Turn-Round-Time

WT/ST %

1991

1.84

3.52

5.36

34.3

1992

2.97

3.4

6.37

87.4

1993

2.88

1.57

4.45

183.4

1994

3.47

2.93

6.4

118.4

1995

2.59

2.01

4.6

128.9

1996

2.45

1.45

3.9

169.0

1997

2.98

1.22

4.2

204.3

1998

1.36

2.94

4.3

46.3

Average

2.6

2.9

4.9

89.7

Source: KPA Annual Reports.

1994 and 1998.
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On average, it is 4.9 days. In 1998, waiting time at the port of Durban was 20 hours,
ship working time was 31 hours hence, waiting time to service time ratio was 64.5%.
Ship turn-round time at the port is 2.1 days (Portia Management Services, 1998).
Waiting time ratio is not good, waiting time is too long in relation to working time.
Waiting time is shorter at DSM port than the port of Durban. However, total Ship
time in port is shorter at Durban than at DSM port.
Causes of waiting time with their average percentages in blakets as obtained from
DSM port statistics include the following :
•

Weather -rainfall and wind (16%)

•

Waiting for shore handling equipment (7.7%)

•

Waiting for cargo (12%)

•

Machine break-downs (6.7%)

•

Waiting for lorries and wagons (11%)

•

Openning/closing hatches (3.9%)

•

Ship not at berth (6%)

•

Electrical power failures (2.7%)

•

A Master failing to complete ship papers prior to berthing of a ship (3.6%)

•

Waiting for labour shift (2.8%)

•

Early finish (8.4%)

•

Miscelleneous (19%)

3. 2.3

Container Dwell Time

Container dwell time refers to time spent in port by a container from its arrival to its
departure. Container dwell time for imports, exports and empties at the port of DarEs-Salaam is shown in Table 11.
3.2.3.1

Analysis of Container Dwell Time

Dwell time for imports is 29 days on average. In 1998, it was 31 days. It was more
than the dwell time from 1991 to 1994. The recommended dwell time is 3 to
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Table 11.

Container Dwell Time (Days per container)

Years

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Average

Imports

23.0

19.0

20.0

29.0

42.0

34.0

34.0

31.0

29.0

Exports

2.0

3.0

3.0

4.0

3.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

4.0

Empties

7.0

14.0

16.5

14.0

32.0

22.0

8.0

9.0

14.4

Source: DSM Port Statistics

4 days (Horck, J. 2000). The desired dwell time at the port is 7 days at most. At
Durban port, dwell time for imports is 4 days (Portia Management Services, 1998)
and in the port of Hamburg, it is 4 days (Bluert, C. 2000) too. Comparing the
container dwell time at the port with the desired dwell time by the port and with that
of the two ports, it can be clearly seen that, the container dwell time at the port is
extremely long, it is about ten times the recommended time and that of the two ports.
It is more than four times of the desired dwell time. At the port of Mombasa, the
average dwell time for imports is 15 days (East Africa, 20/5/2000). This dwell time
is about half of that, at Dar-Es-Salaam port.
3.2.3.2 Causes of Long Container Dwell Time
Some of the prominent causes of long cargo dwell time at the port are mentioned and
explained under the subsquent explanation.
3.2.3.2.1

Cargo Documents Clearance

It is a requirement for anybody who clears cargo from the port to have proper official
cargo documents. The documents enable him or her to clear his/her goods from the
port. The procedure for clearing cargo is as follows: Prior to delivery of a container,
the importer or his clearing agent is supposed to make sure that, the details on
delivery documents are identical to those appearing on the terminal container
records. On presentation of the documents, container records are consulted and their
positions in the yard are identified.
In Tanzania, for proper collection of revenue, import control, state security as well as
for security of cargo itself, a consignee has to be cleared by customs, ship agents and
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port officials. A consignee is regarded to have a clear document when, his/her
documents contain the information of cargo as per the records received by the port
and which, is cleared by all the concerned officials. In most cases, it takes a long
time to clear documents by consignees or their agents. Reasons for delays in getting
clear documents are as follows:
1. Different locations for officials who are responsible for clearing the documents
As stated earlier, documents for cargo have to be examined by custom authorities,
ship agents and port authorities. These authorities are situated far away from each
other. A consignee or his/her agent has to move from one place to another where the
officials’ offices are located. Besides this, he/she or the agent faces a number of
bureaucratic problems which hinder a smooth and quick cargo documents clearance
process. Due to this, delay in getting clear cargo documents occurs.
2.

Poor means of communication

In case one of the documents required for clearing cargo is missing, or in case there
is an error in one of the documents after the consignee has handed them to a
particular official, the document will be left unattended until the consignee or his
agent physically meet the concerned official. Even in cases where the consignee or
his agent has telephone, most of the officials do not bother to contact them instead,
they will keep the documents aside till when the consignee or his/her agent appears
physically. This means that, the clearance process will stop for a while, it will
continue again when the consignee or his/her agent appears. This, attributes to
delays in the cargo clearance process.
3.

Little time allocated for cargo documents clearance documentation

Official hours for receiving and processing documents are from 08:00 to 15:00 hours
excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays (SSHEX). However, due to security of
money which is received from different kinds of payments at the port, cash offices
close at 13:00 hour for safe handling of cash to the bank.
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4.

Long time for customs verification

Cargo clearance documents are released by the customs authority after conducting a
physical verification. On average, a 100% verification takes 2 hours for one twenty
feet equivalent unit (TEU). Time for verification may be longer or less depending on
the nature of container contents, number of staff doing the verification, parties to be
involved, verification area and unpredictable situations such as rain.
The customs clearance procedure is long and cumbersome, this is why it causes
delays in cargo clearance

The Chairman of the Tanzania Freight Forwarders

Association (TAFFA) complained that, cumbersome documentation and customs
cargo clearance procedure is one of the causes of long cargo dwell time (East Africa,
18/Nov/1998).
3.2.3.2.2

Long Container Delivery Procedure

After completing the cargo clearing procedure, the consignee or his/her clearing
agent obtains a delivery order which he/she presents to the port officials. At a
container terminal, the procedure for clearing a container is as follows:
i.

The consignee/clearing agent presents a copy of declaration and disposal
order to the delivery office.

ii.

After a certain time, a stop list is prepared and posted to the computer room,
thereafter, it is sent to a yard supervisor for identification of the container
position in the yard.

iii.

After the identification of the position of the container in the yard, the list is
posted to the yard supervisor who gives the consignee or his/her agent a
loading permit.

iv.

From the yard supervisor, the consignee or the clearing agent proceeds to the
security office for counter checking.
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v.

Thereafter, the consignee or the clearing agent with the overland transporter
present the loading permit to the RTG clerk who directs the haulier to pack
his vehicle or put his wagon at a particular position ready for loading.

vi.

After loading, the haulier moves the container to the check point gate for
inspection whereby, a gate pass and interchange report is issued.

vii.

Finally, the container moves to the security gate and exit.

With such a long process which require consignees to move from here and there
within the port, and having in mind that, there are a number of consignees or clearing
agents who go through the process at the same time, delays are bound to happen.
3.2.3.2.3

Other Reasons

1. Financial constraints: Sometimes, consignees collect their cargo late because, of
lack of funds for paying customs charges/import duties and for paying THA port
charges. This in most cases happens when there is sudden increase in tariff,
resulting in unplanned expenses by consignees.
2. Late receipt of Bills of Lading by consignees.
3. Consignees not being aware of the arrival of their cargo at the port: This is
caused by the inefficiency of the National Shipping Agency (NASACO), the then
sole Shipping agency. This argument can be supported by the complaint
expressed by TAFFA about NASACO. TAFFA attributed NASACO as one of
the causes of long cargo dwell time. The Chairman of the association said, the
inefficieny of NASACO is a cause of delay in cargo removal. He complained
that, some of its members have lost potential customers to Durban in South
Africa. Some principles have moved from Tanzania ports to other ports. The
port has because of this, lost a substantial cargo throughput and revenues (East
Africa,18th Nov,1998).
4. Consignees waiting for partial tax exemption from the Ministry of Treasury.
This is common for Government Institutions. Sometimes, it takes a long time to
get the exemption.
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5. Lack of knowledge in documentation procedure by consignees who are not using
clearing agents. It takes a long time for them to complete the clearance process.
6. Consignees waiting for acceptance or otherwise of their requests for waiver of
storage charges.
7. Failure to secure wagons in time by consignees especially TRC wagons.
8. Lack of inland transport due to closure of some sections of the railway lines
particularly TRC railway lines and some parts of roads undergoing repairs. This
usually happens when there are heavy rainfalls, especially in the northern part of
Tanzania. TRC data reveals that, on average, from 1994 to 1998, there are 1538
hours and 1305 hours of railway closure per year due to accidents and floods
respectively (TRC 1994 to 1998 Annual Reports).
9. Consignees keeping their cargo at the port while looking for buyers. This is a
consequence of lower charges at the port than outside storages.
3.3 Security of Cargo
Security of cargo at the port of Dar-Es-Salaam is not good. The Principal Statistician
of the port said that, the port has problems with security of cargo howver, no proper
records are kept about losses and damages (personal communication, 8/12/1999).
There are a number of cases of pilferage, losses and damages. Processing of claims
is also poorly handled (THA Corporate Strategic Plan 1996/97-2000/01).

For

example, from January to June 1998, claims put forward for payment approval every
moth amounted to 236,519,866.8 TShs (about 394.199.78 USD) on avearge. Claims
sent to finance department for payment settlement amounts to an average of
14,685,418.4 Tshs (about 24.475.7 USD).
operations department

Claims awaiting responses from

amount to an average of 199,269,853.3 Tshs (about

332.116.42 USD) and claims on hand still under investigation are 434,920,046.7
Tshs (about 724.866.7 USD) on average (see Appendix B).
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Comparing the quality of service at DSM port with the quality of service at
Mombasa port, the situation is more or less the same. In Freight (Aug/Sept,1998), it
is said that, Uganda Minister for trade and Industry has called for faster
documentation and its own country section at the port to protect its cargo from
pilferage. Uganda demand to have its own security due to poor security of cargo at
the port. From Appendix C, it can be seen that, in 1998, claims arising from missing
cargo which, was brought forward from 1997 amounted to 35,105,373.85 KShs
(about 583.508.96 USD). Claims lodged during the year amounted to 99,274,479.64
KShs (about 1.650.457.47 USD). At the port of Durban, the quality of service
regarding security of cargo is better than at DSM port. In the THA Corporate
strategy (1996/97-2000/01) it is said that, DSM port ranks low in security of cargo
and processing of claims when compared to competing ports in the south of Africa.
3.4 Customer Service
Customer service is a customer oriented philosophy which, intergrates and manages
all elements of the customer interface. Good customer service is the output of
customer satsfaction (Gray, R. 2000).
Dar-Es-Salaam port used to have captive customers that is, customers who had no
alternative ports from countries in the south of Africa, during civil wars in
Mozambique and apartheid regime in South Africa. As a result of this, the port as
well as the port community developed a tendency to see themselves as Kings of their
businesses instead of their customers. They were treating their customers according
to their wishes and not according to customers' wants. This kind of attitude is still
there after the end of civil wars in Mozambique and apartheid regime in South Africa
which, have led to ports in these countries especially the port of Durban to compete
with DSM port. Poor quality of customer service is onother aspects of quality of
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service which, DSM port ranks low as compared to South African ports (THA
Corporate Strategy, 1996/97-2000/2001).
3.5 Summary
The quality of service is related to the level of satisfaction of the customer. The
quality of service at Dar-Es-Salaam port is poor. However, the performance of the
port in terms of TEUs/hour, waiting time to service time ratio and ship turn-round
time, is better than that of Mombasa port. The performance of the port in terms of
tons/gang per shift, tons per ship per day and in terms of dwell time, is poor than that
of Mombasa port. The quality of service in terms of cargo security at the two ports,
is more or less the same. The port of Durban is far better in every aspect of quality
of service than the port of DSM. This being the case, DSM port can not lose cargo to
Mombasa port because, of its poor quality of service. The port of DSM can lose
cargo to the port of Durban.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE HINTERLAND OF DAR-ES-SALAAM PORT AND ITS ABILITY TO
GENERATE DRY CARGO FOR SEA BORNE TRADE
4.1

Introduction

The literal meaning of hinterland’s ability to generate dry cargo is, the physical
capability of the hinterland to produce dry cargo. In this context, it means both ability
to produce dry cargo for export as well as the capability to buy dry cargo for imports.
The exports and imports concerned are those which, are transported by ships.
A particular hinterland’s ability to generate dry cargo may increase or remain constant
but, its volume of cargo through a particular port which has competitors may decline
because, the port’s competitors are able to attract more cargo from the hinterland.
When the hinterland’s ability to generate cargo grows, the total volume of cargo
through the competing ports increases and vice-versa. When the hinterland’s ability to
generate cargo is declining, cargo through the more competitive ports may not decline,
it will decline at the less competitive port (s). In case the competing ports are more or
less equally competitive, cargo through each of the ports may decline.
In this chapter, investigation has been done to identify a country or countries among
the countries served by DSM port which, is/are causing a decline in dry cargo through
the port. Investigation and analysis has also been done to find out

whether, a

particular country’s or countries’ ability to generate dry cargo is not declining but, DarEs-Salaam port is losing cargo to its competitors. Dry cargo growth rates from each of
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the Great Lakes countries through DSM port and Mombasa port, the ports which are
sharing this hinterland, have been compared and, the share of the cargo through DSM
port has been analysed. For the hinterland which is shared by DSM port and Durban
port that is, Zambia and Malawi, investigation has been done by analysing the trends of
dry cargo to/from the countries through DSM port. This is because of lack of data on
dry cargo to/from each of these countries through the port of Durban. Causes for
declining ability to generate dry cargo by the hinterland or part of it are investigated.
Before the analysis is done, DSM port’s hinterland and the port’s competitors are
explained. Comparison of trends of the volume of dry cargo through DSM port,
Mombasa port and the port of Durban is made. This comparison has been done in
order to see, how the other ports are fairing in comparison with DSM port.
4.2

Dar-Es-Salaam Port’s Hinterland

As earlier stated, the hinterland of DSM port include Tanzania as well as landlocked
countries which are Burundi, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda,
Zambia and Malawi . The share of dry cargo via DSM port to and from each of these
countries is indicated in Table 12 and Figure 2. Figure 3 shows the port’s hinterland.
Table 12. Percentage Share of Dry Cargo each Country
Served by DSM Port
Years
Tanzania Zambia Burundi Congo Rwanda Malawi Uganda
1991
43.2
29.0
7.6
7.7
2.5
7.5
2.3
1992
41.2
40.1
5.3
4.0
2.0
5.9
0.7
1993
47.7
27.1
6.6
5.6
6.5
5.8
0.7
1994
50.7
25.4
12.0
3.5
4.8
1.5
2.1
1995
57.3
20.3
8.2
6.0
5.0
0.6
2.8
1996
57.4
17.9
4.0
9.2
6.2
0.8
4.3
1997
67.6
15.0
1.8
4.7
5.9
0.5
4.5
1998
69.6
13.0
2.2
3.5
3.3
0.3
2.8
Average
54.3
23.5
6.4
5.5
4.5
2.9
2.5
Source: Author’s Calculations {volume of dry cargo from a particular country (see Table 19)
divided by, the total dry cargo throughput (see Table 1), multiply by 100}.

39

Percentage share from/to each of the Countries
served by DSM Port
Tanzania
Zambia

6%
54%
23%

Burundi
DRC
Rw anda
Malaw i
Uganda

Figure 2
From Table 12 and Figure 2, it can be noted that, the major users of the port are
Tanzanian exporters and importers. On average, Tanzania cargo accounts for 54%
while, dry cargo from /to the six countries account for 45.07%. The share of Tanzania
cargo has been increasing from 43.2% in 1991 to 69.6% in 1998. The second main
user of the port is Zambia. Its dry cargo accounts for 23.5% on average from 1991 to
1998. Looking at the trend, this share has been declining. The largest share was in
1992, it was 40.1%. In 1998, it was 13%. The third largest user of the port is Burundi.
Its average share is 6.4%. This country’s cargo share is also declining. The largest
share was in 1994, it was 12.0%. From 1995, the share has been declining, in 1998 it
was 2.2%. Burundi is followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo then, Rwanda
comes after DRC. Malawi ranks fifth and the last one is Uganda. The shares of these
countries except Uganda have been declining.

The share of the Republic of Congo

was 9.2% in 1996 and it was 3.5% in 1998. The share of Malawi cargo was 7.5% in
1991, it was 0.3% in 1998. Looking at the shares on yearly basis, Malawi has been the
least user of the port since 1994. The share of Ugandan dry cargo in the total dry cargo
through Dar-Es-Salaam port was 2.3% in 1991, while in 1998, it was 2.8%. However,
from 1994 to 1997, it had been increasing. The largest share was in 1997, it was 4.5%.
Users of a port may be captive users or not. Captive users are those users who do not
have alternative means, they have to use the port whether they like it or not. Port
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Figure 3

THE HINTERLAND OF DAR-ES-SALAAM PORT
(Excluding Kenya and Mozambique)
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customers who are not captives have alternative ports which they can use. They can
shift from one port to another, looking for a port which can satisfy better, most of their
requirements. As far as the port of DSM is concerned, its captive customers are most
of the importers and exporters from Tanzania. Non captive customers are those from
landlocked countries. The landlocked countries can be served by other ports found in
the south and in the east African regions. The alternative ports, means of transport
and routes to these countries are explained in the following part.
4.3

Alternative Ports and Inland Transport to Landlocked Countries

The alternative ports are grouped into East African Region and South African Region.
4.3.1

Ports in the East African Region

There are two major ports in the East African Region, Dar-Es-Salaam and Mombasa.
These two ports are competitors for cargo from/to the Great Lakes Countries. The
altrnative routes and means of transport from these ports to the countries are shown in
Tables 13 and 14.
4.3.1.1 The Port of Dar-Es-Salaam
It can be noted from Table 13 that, there are two railway corporations, the TanzaniaZambia Railways Corporation (TAZARA) and the Tanzania Railways Corporation
(TRC) providing transport services to the countries. There is road transport and
inland water transport too. The state of transport from the port to its hinterland is not
satisfactory particularly, transport by TRC which operates in the northern part of
Tanzania. TRC railway lines are affected by frequent accidents and floods during rain
season. From 1994 to 1997, there were an average of 15.382 hours and 1.305.5 hours
of line closures per year due to accidents and floods respectively (TRC Annual
Reports). Some parts of the roads in the north are not easily passable during rain
seasons (Daily News.25/5/1998). Both railway lines (TAZARA) and roads in the
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Table 13. DSM Port and Overland Transport Routes to Landlocked Countries
Destination
Zambia

Route and Modes of Transport

TAZARA Railway
TanZam Highway
TAZAMA Pipeline
DRC
TAZARA Railway via Zambia TAZARA Railway, road to Mpulungu and Lake to DRC
TanZam Highway via Zambia Railway
TRC Railway to Kigoma via Lake to DRC
Road to Southern DRC via Zambia and via Burundi to Eastern DRC
Malawi
TAZARA Railway to Mbeya, road to Malawi/road toMalaw
Burundi
TRC Railway to Kigoma via Lake to Burundi TRC Railway to Isaka, road to Burundi
Road to Burundi
Rwanda
TRC Railway to Kigoma, Lake or road to Rwanda
Road to Rwanda
Uganda
TRC Railway to Mwanza, Lake to Uganda
Road to Uganda
Source: THA/TAZARA/TRC/SATCC

southern part that is, transport connecting DSM port with Zambia and Malawi are
good. Besides the transport infrastructure, both TRC and TAZARA do not have
sufficient wagons (East Africa. 3/3/2000).
4.3.1.2

The Port of Mombasa

Mombasa port is in Kenya, in the northern part of Tanzania. It is the only port which
competes with the port of Dar-Es-Salaam in the north. It has a natural harbour with
total berth length of 3044 m. The port has a total of 16 berths with transit shed space
of 106,281m2. Three berths with a total legth of 596 metres are devoted for container
ships. It has a capacity to handle 250,000 TEUs per year. The container terminal has 4
ships to shore gantry cranes, 40 shore gantry cranes, 11 rubber tyre gantry cranes and 2
rail mounted cranes. General cargo berths comprise of 13 berths with quay length of
2448 m. It is equiped with portal cranes, mobile cranes, forklift trucks and overhead
conveyor for bulk soda ash. In 1998, 960 dry cargo deep sea vessels called at the port.
Its major routes to landlocked countries are shown in the Table 14 and Figure 4.
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Table 14. Mombasa Port and Inland Transport
Routes to Landlocked Countries
Destination

Route and Modes of Transport

Burundi

Road via Uganda and Rwanda

Rwanda

Road via Uganda
Road via Tanzania

DRC (Zaire)

Road via Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi
Road/Lake via Tanzania
Road via Tanzania and Burundi or Rwanda

Uganda

Road
KRC Railway

Source: KPA/KRC (Kenya Railways Corporation)

The port is connected to Congo by roads and railway via either Tanzania or Uganda
and via either Burundi or Rwanda. It is connected to Burundi and Rwanda by roads
and railways via either Uganda or Tanzania. It is directly connected to Uganda by
roads and Kenya railways. The state of transport infrastructure connecting Mombasa
and its hinterland is not good in some parts. In Freight (Aug./Sept., 1998), it is said
that, `more Uganda shippers move to alternative southern route due to poor state of
Mombasa – Nairobi Highway. However, most of the roads are better than the roads
connecting DSM port and the Great Lakes region (Freight, Dec/Jan,1998).
4.3.2

Ports in the Southern Africa Region

Under this part, ports in the southern Africa and their overland transport connections to
landlocked countries are mentioned. Explanation on the port of Durban which is DSM
port’s main competitor in the southern region is provided.
4.3.2.1

Ports in the Southern Region and Overland Transport Connections to

Landlocked Countries
Ports in the southern region and their inland transport connections to landlocked
countries are shown in Table 15 and Figure 5.
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Figure 4
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Table 15. Ports in the Southern Africa and Inland Transport
Routes to Landlocked Countries
Destinations
Nacala to Malawi and Zambia

Routes and modes of Transport
Railway to Zambia
Road to Blantyre, Lilongwe and Zambia

Beira to Malawi and Zambia

Railway to Blantyre and Lilongwe Railway to
Blantyre, Lilongwe and Zambia
Railway to Zambia

Maputo to Zambia, Malawi and

Railways to Zambia

DRC

Road to Zambia, Malawi and DRC

Durban to Zambia and Malawi

Railways via Zimbabwe to Zambia and Malawi

Durban to Great Lakes Countries

Railway via Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania*

Durban to Uganda

Railway via Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania*

Cape Town to Zambia and DRC

Railways to Zambia and DRC
Road to Zambia and DRC

Walvis Bay to Zambia and DRC

Railway to Zambia and DRC
Road to Zambia and DRC

Source: South African Ports/Hoff & Overgaard a/s SATCC. 1996.
Note: *These are planned routes (Freight, Aug/Sept, 1998).

In the southern part of Africa as well as southern part of Tanzania, there are a number
of ports which can serve the landlocked countries which are served by the port of DarEs-Salaam. Currently, only Malawi and Zambia are served by some of these ports.
These ports include: Nacala, Maputo and Beira in Mozambique, Walvis Bay in
Namibia, Lobito in Angola and South Africa ports. The ports in South Africa are
Richards Bay, Durban, Port Elizabeth, East London, Mossel Bay, Cape Town and
Saldanha Bay.
4.3.2.2 The Port of Durban
The port of Durban is situated in the east coast of South Africa. It is the major port in
South Africa. It is the country’s main general cargo and container port. It handles
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65% on avarage of the Country’s entire traffic. It handles most of the transhipment

Figure 5
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cargo passing through South African ports. In 1998, it transhiped 2.387.566 tons of
dry cargo which are equivalent to 78% of total transhiped dry cargo through South
Africa ports. It is geographically located at the convergence of the world’s major
shipping routes hence, it serves a number of domestic and international markets. Its
container traffic has been increasing at a rate of 8% per year. Its entrance channel is
12.8 m depth and 122 m width.
The port covers a total of 1.854 hectares and the total distance around it is 21
kilometres. It has 57 berths, eight berths are for container terminal. It offers users
operational advantage which include frequency of shipments (in 1998, about 2700 dry
cargo deep sea vessels called at the port), destinations served and good intermodal link
connecting the rest of Africa (see Figure 5) . Freight to the port and port charges are
cheaper due to economies of scale (Kinunda. Communication. 14/12/2000. Also see
Appendix E). It has 12 railway bound gantry cranes, fork-lift trucks ranging from 2.5
to 42 tons safe working load (SWL) for general cargo handling. Other equipment are 7
reach stackers equiped with 6/12 metres telescopic container spreaders, 60 tractors and
varied trailers for horizontal transport of cargo, fourteen R 11.5 metres multi-purpose
mobile Godzilla cranes capable of lifting 100 tons of cargo, special attachments that
provide a 48.5 m reach,

and it has a control tower from which operations are

controlled (The Port of Durban Handbook and Directory, 1999/2000).
4.4

Comparison of Dry Cargo through DSM Port, Mombasa Port and the
Port of Durban

Table 16 and Figure 6 show that, the trend of the volume of dry cargo throughput at
Mombasa port and Durban port is better than, at DSM port.
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Table 16. Dry Cargo through DSM, Mombasa and Durban Ports
Years

DSM

1991

1.894

1992

2.345

23.8

3.962

24.3

27.000

13.5

1993

2.452

4.6

4.115

3.9

25.400

-6.0

1994

2.071

-15.6

12.524

45.0

25.000

-1.6

1995

2.084

0.7

4.355

-27.0

26.250

5.0

1996

1.665

-20.1

4.908

12.7

31.500

20.0

1997

1.836

10.2

6.163

25.6

30.200

-4.0

1998

1.819

-0.9

5.720

-7.2

30.840

2.0

Aveage

Trend %

Mombasa

Trend %

Durban

3.187

0.34

Trend %

23.800

9.7

3.6

Source: DSM Port Statistics, KPA Annual Reports (1994 &1998) and Durban
Handbook and Directory. 199972000 (extracted from Bar chart).
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Figure 6.
The average growth rate at Mombasa port is 9.7%, at the port of Durban it is 3.65%
while at DSM port, it is 0.34%. In 1998, the volume of cargo at Mombasa port was
79% higher than the volume in 1991, at the port of Durban, it was 33% higher while, at
DSM port, it was 3.9% less the throughput in 1991. This indicates that, the other two
ports are able to attract more customers than, DSM port.

49

4.5 Generation of Dry Cargo by Each Country Served by DSM Port
The share of traffic belonging to each country at a particular port as shown in Table 13,
may increase or decrease, depending on its rate of traffic growth in relation to the rate
of growth of traffic belonging to other countries. Shares do not show the effect of the
volume of a particular country’s cargo to the total traffic at a particular port.The effect
of the volume of traffic from/to each country on the total traffic passing through the
port is shown by the rate of traffic growth for each country’s cargo. Traffic growth for
each country is shown and analysed in the subsequent disccusions. The aim of this
analysis is to identify a country or countries which, contribute to the declining dry
cargo throughput at the port of Dar-Es-Salaam.
4.5.1

Traffic Generation by Tanzania
Table 17.

Exports and Imports from/to Tanzania Through DSM Port

Years

Imports

1991

563.746

1992

677.715

20.2

289.028

13.5

966.743

18.1

1993

854.789

26.1

314.270

8.7

1.169.059

20.9

1994

795.166

-7.0

25.893

-19.9

1.047.059

-10.4

1995

836.171

5.2

357.152

41.8

1.193.323

14.0

1996

645.768

-22.8

311.148

-12.9

956.916

-20.0

1997

946.606

46.7

2 93.827

-5.6

1.240.433

29.6

1998

950.820

0.5

314.857

7.1

1.265.677

2.0

Average

Growth %

Exports %

Growth %

254.717

8.6
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Growth %

818.463

4 .1

Source: DSM Port Performance Statistics
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Figure 7.
In 1992 and 1993, the total dry cargo to/from Tanzania through the port of Dar-EsSalaam increased by 18.1% and 20.9% respectively. In 1994, it decreased by 10.4%.
This decrease was attributed by a 19.9% decrease in exports and a 7% decrease in
imports. The performance of the overall economy was the cause for this decline. The
economic growth in 1992 was 5.7%. In 1993 and 1994, it dropped to 4.2% and 3.0%
respectively. In 1994, negative growth rates were recorded in mining (-1.1%) and
manufacturing (-3.8%). Growth rates for Agriculture and Industry were low, they were
0.4% and 0.6% respectively (Statistical Abstarct, 1997). In 1995, there was a 41.8%
increase in exports, imports increased by 5.2%. These increases attributed to a total
increase in dry cargo from/to Tanzania through the port by 14%. In 1996, the volume
of dry cargo decreased by 20%. The decrease was a result of a decrease in exports by
12.9% and that of imports by 22.8%. In 1997 and 1998, the volume of dry cargo
to/from the country through the port increased.The highest volume was in 1998, it was
1.265.577 metric tonnes. The highest volume of imports was in 1998 too, it was
950.820 metric tonnes. On average, imports have been growing at an average rate of
8.6%. The highest volume of exports was in 1995, it was 357.352 metric tonnes. The
average growth rate of exports was 4.1%. On average, the volume of dry cargo
to/from Tanzania through DSM port has been growing at a rate of 6.9%.
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From this analysis, it can be said that, the declining traffic throughput at Dar-EsSalaam port is not caused by a decline in cargo from/to Tanzania. It is caused by either
each of the landlocked countries it serves or, by some of them.
4.5.2

Dry Cargo Generated by the Great Lakes Countries

The volume of dry generated by the Great lakes countries is shown in Table 18.
Table 18. Traffic Generated by Burundi, Congo, Rwanda and
Uganda for Dar- Es-Salaam Port. (in metric tons)
Years
Burundi
Congo
Rwanda
1991
143.577
146.487
47.051
1992
124.285
94.535
46.144
1993
162.818
136.211 159.092
1994
249.282
71.429
99.795
1995
171.834
125.365 103.051
1996
65.100
153.068 103.618
1997
32.697
85.746 108.285
1998
39.649
64.335
60.394
Source: DSM Port Performance Statistics.

Uganda
43.374
16.348
17.247
44.217
57.506
71.987
83.135
51.687

Total
380.489
218.820
475.368
464.723
457.753
393.773
309.863
216.065

%Growth
-42.5
117.2
-2.2
-1.5
-14.0
-21.3
-30.3

From Table 18 and Figure 8 it can be observed that, the total dry cargo from these
countries had been decreasing during the whole period except, in 1993. Between 1991
and 1992, it decreased by 42.5% while between 1992 and 1993, it increased by
117.2%. In 1993, the countries generated the largest volume of the cargo, it amounted
to 475.386 tons. In 1994, cargo for Burundi and Uganda increased while, cargo for
DRC and Rwanda decreased.

In 1998, cargo for all the countries except Burundi

decreased. The total volume decreased by 30.3%, it was 43.2% lower than its volume
in 1991. During the year, the countries generated the smallest volume of the cargo.
They generated 216.065 tons. This decline contributed to the declining dry cargo
through the port of Dar-Es-Salaam.
In the following part, analysis of the trend of cargo from/to each of the countries
through DSM port and Mombasa port has been done in order to determine whether,
cargo is declining at the former port while, it is increasing at the later or not.
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Figure 8.
4.5.2.1

Dry Cargo Generation by Burundi

Dry cargo generated by this country is shown in Table 19.
Table 19.

Dry Cargo from/to Burundi through DSM and Mombasa
Ports and Share of Cargo through DSM Port (In metric tons)

Years

DSM

1991

143.577

1992

124.285

-13.4

41.669

53.1

165.954

5.9

75.0

1993

162.818

31.0

21.774

-47.8

184.592

17.8

88.2

1994

249.282

53.1

36.296

66.7

285.578

55.0

87.3

1995

171.834

-42.3

48.228

-83.8

220.062

-26.1

78.1

1996

65.100

-62.1

12.972

-95.6

78.072

-64.5

83.4

1997

32.697

-49.8

0

-100.0

32.697

-58.1

100.0

1998

39.649

21.3

1.169

100.0

40.818

24.8

97.1

-4.9

87.6

Average

Trend %

Mombasa

Trend %

13.065

Total

Trend %

156.642

-7.8

-13.4

Share %
91.7

Source: DSM Port Statistics and KPA 1994 and 1998 Annual Reports.

From Table 19 it can be observed that, in 1992, the volume of dry cargo through DSM
port decreased while, at Mombasa port, it increased. In 1993, it increased at DSM port
while, it decreased at Mombasa port. In 1994, it increased at both ports while, from
1995 to 1997, dry cargo from/to Burundi through the port of Dar-Es-Salaam and
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Mombasa port, decreased at both the ports.

The average growth rates of the traffic

through the ports are –7.8% and –13.4% respectively. The total average growth rate is
–4.9%. This declining trend shows that, the country’s ability to generate dry cargo is
decreasing. The decrease contributes to the declining dry cargo through Dar-EsSalaam port.
The share of cargo passing through DSM port was 91.7% in 1991 while in 1998, it was
97.1%. From 1992 to 1996, there was a decrease of an average of 9.3% in the share.
DSM port lost cargo to Mombasa port in 1992. In 1993, Mombasa lost cargo to DSM
port. In 1994, growth in the volume of cargo was higher at Mombasa port. In 1997
and 1998, the share increased. On average, the share of the country’s dry cargo
through DSM port is 87.6%. More of the country’s cargo pass through DSM port.
This is because, DSM route offers shorter distances than Mombasa route.

For

example, the distance from DSM to Bujumbura by rail via lake Tanganyika is 1430
Kms, by rail/road via Isaka is 1854 kms and by road only via Lushaunga is 1821 Kms
while, the distance from Mombasa via Isebania is 2156 Kms (Chiwala, 1989). Another
advantage of DSM port over Mombasa is that, cargo pass through one border while,
cargo through Mombasa passes through more than one border.
Reasons for the decreasing ability by this country to maintain/ increase the traffic
generation are as follows:
♦ Civil war and political instability in the country.
♦ Trade embargo against Burundi for violation of human rights.
♦ The economy of the country has been declining. From 1990 to 1997, the growth
rates in total GDP, Agricultural GDP and Industrial GDP had been negative (see
Appendix D1). In 1997 and 1998, the economy started to pick up however, it was
less than the GDP for each year from 1991 to 1995 (see Appendix D2).
4.5.2.2

Dry Cargo Generation by the Democratic Republic of Congo
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Dry cargo generated by this country is shown in Table 20. This Table indicates that,
in1992 and 1997, dry cargo from the country through DSM port decreased by 35.5%
and 44% while, at Mombasa port it increased by 77.5% and 43.2% respectively. In
1994 and 1998, cargo decreased at both ports. In 1996, dry cargo through DSM port
increased by 22.1% while, at Mombasa port, it decreased by 70.1%. The market share
of the cargo through DSM port has decreased. The largest share was in 1991, it was
Table 20.

Dry Cargo from/to DRC through DSM Port and MombasPort and Share
of the Cargo through DSM Port

Year

DSM

1991

146.487

1992

94.535

-35.5

105.519

77.5

200.054

-2.9

47.3

1993

136.211

44.1

284.549

169.7

420.760

110.3

32.4

1994

71.429

-47.6

142.992

-49.8

214.421

-49.0

33.3

1995

125.365

75.5

260.332

82.1

385.697

79.9

32.5

1996

153.068

22.1

77.932

-70.1

231.000

40.1

66.3

1997

85.746

-44.0

111.618

43.2

197.364

-14.6

43.5

1998

64.335

-25.0

70.270

-37.0

134.605

-31.9

48.0

16.5

46.8

Average

Trend %

Mombasa

Trend %

59.458

-1.3

Total

Trend%

205.945

27.0

Share %
71.1

Source: DSM Port Statistics and KPA 1994 and 1998 Annual Reports.

71.1%. In 1998, the share was 48%. On average, the share is 46.8%. There are
occasional shifts of cargo between the ports. However, more cargo pass through
Mombasa port. This is the case because, of better transport infrastructure of the
Mombasa route.
In 1997 and 1998, the total volume of dry cargo decreased by 14.6% and 31.9%
respectively. In 1998, cargo declined at both ports. The volume of dry cargo through
the two ports was 65.4% less than in 1991. The average growth rates were –1.3%,
27% and 16.5% for DSM port, Mombasa port and the total volume. The declining
ability of the country to generate dry cargo and, the loss of cargo by DSM port to
Mombasa are contributing to the declining dry cargo volume through DSM port.
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Reasons for the declining ability to generate dry cargo by the Democratic Republic of
Congo are as follows:
♦ War which is going on in the country.
♦ The economic development is poor. From 1990 to 1995, growth rates in total GDP
and Agriculture GDP had been negative. GDP for Industry was positive. Between
1990 and 1997, Industry GDP was negative while, for Agriculture it was positive
(see Appendix D1). In 1996 and 1997, there was a positive growth in the economy
while, in 1998, there was a negative growth (see Appendix D2).
4.5.2.3

Dry Cargo Generation by Rwanda

Table 21 shows dry cargo generated by Rwanda.
Table 21.

Dry Cargo from/to Rwanda through the Port of DSM anMombasa
port and Share of Cargo through DSM Port

Years

DSM

Trend %

Mombasa

Trend %

Trend %

47.051

1992

46.144

-1.9

113.458

11.6

159.602

7.3

29.0

1993

159.092

244.8

124.407

9.7

283.499

77.6

56.1

1994

99.795

-37.3

177.966

43.1

277.761

-2.0

36.0

1995

103.051

3.3

493.569

177.3

596.620

114.8

17.3

1996

103.618

0.6

795.614

61.2

899.232

50.7

11.5

1997

108.285

4.5

166.962

-79.0

275.247

-69.4

39.3

1998

60.394

-44.2

94.372

-43.5

154.766

-43.8

39.0

16.4

32.5

21.2

148.712

Share %

1991

Average

101.661

Total

22.6

31.6

Source: DSM Ports Statistics aand KPA 1994 and 1998 Annual Bulletins

In 1992 and 1994, the volume of dry cargo through the port of DSM dropped by 1.9%
and 37.3% while, at the Mombasa, it increased by 11.6% and 43.1% respectively. In
1997, it increased by 4.5% at DSM port while, at Mombasa port it decreased by 79%.
The average growth rates are 21.25% and 22.6% respectively.

The share of the

drycargo for Dar-Es-Salaam port was 31.9% in 1991. In 1995 and 1996, the share
decreased to 17.3% and 11.5% respectively. The reason for the decrease was that,
Mombasa port was able to attract more cargo than, DSM port and not because, DSM
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port lost cargo to Mombasa port. In 1997 and 1998, the share increased to 39%. The
average share is 32.5%. More cargo pass through Mombasa port despite the fact that,
the route has the longest distance because, the route offers all roads transport and roads
are better. The distance from DSM to Kigali by rail/road via Isaka is 1521 Kms and by
road only via Lushaunga is 1529 Kms while, the distance from Mombasa by road only
via Isebania is 1864 Kms. Another reason for more cargo to pass via Mombasa is that,
the country exports tea through Mombasa because, there is an auction for tea .
The trend of the total volume of dry cargo from this country shows that, in 1997 and
1998, it dicreased by 69.4% and 47.8% respectively. This situation indicates that, the
country’s ability to produce dry cargo is declining. The decline contributed to the
decline of dry cargo throughput at DSM port . However, the decline in 1998, did not
contribute to a 3.9% (see Table 1.2.1) decline in dry cargo throughput at DSM port
during the year as compared to 1991 because, the volume of cargo from the country in
1998 was higher than that of 1991.
Reasons for the declining ability of the country to generate dry cargo are as follows:
♦ Civil war and political instability.
♦ The performance of the economy is not good. From 1990 to 1997, the yearly
average growth rates in total GDP, Agriculture GDP and Industry GDP were
negative. They were –12.8%, -10.8% and –17% respectively (see Appendix D1).
Looking at Appendix D2, it can be observed that, in1993 and 1994, The GDP
declined. From 1995 to 1998, GDP picked up but, it was less than the GDP in
1991, 1992 and 1993.
4.5.2.4

Dry Cargo Generation by Uganda

Imports and exports to/from Uganda are indicated in Table 22.
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Table 22.

Dry Cargo from/to Uganda through the Port of DSMombasa Port
and Share of Dry Cargo through DSM Port

Years

DSM

1991

43.374

1992

16.348

-62.3

467.146

54.1

483.494

39.5

3.4

1993

17.247

5.5

475.968

1.9

493.215

2.0

3.5

1994

44.217

189.3

915.600

92.4

959.817

94.6

4.6

1995

57.506

30.0

1.055.843

15.3

1.113.349

16.0

5.2

1996

71.987

25.2

1.212.758

14.9

1.284.745

15.4

5.6

1997

83.135

13.4

871.518

-28.1

954.653

-25.7

8.7

1998

51.687

-37.8

841.901

-3.4

893.588

-6.4

5.8

16.9

6.2

Average

Trend %

Mombasa

Trend %

303.200

20.4

Total

Trend %

346.574

18.4

Share %
12.5

Source: DSM Port Statistics and KPA 1994 and 1998 Annual Reports.

Table 22 shows that, in 1992, dry cargo for Uganda through Dar-Es-Salaam port
decreased by 62.3% while, at Mombasa port, it increased by 54.1%. This means that,
DSM port lost cargo to Mombasa port. Its cargo share decreased from 12.5% to 3.4%.
From 1993 to 1997, dry cargo through the port had been growing. The rate of increase
of Ugandan cargo through DSM port had been higher than the rate at Mombasa port.
The average growth rates are 20.4% and 18.4% respectively. In 1997, the volume of
dry cargo at DSM port increased by 13.4% while at Mombasa port, it decreased by
28.1%. In Freght (Aug/Sept,1989) it is said that, `improved transit times of the DSM
route coupled with delays at Mombasa port are encouraging more Ugandan shippers to
move to DSM port. From 1993 to 1997, the share of the cargo through Dar-Es-Salaam
port had also been improving. On average, the share is 6.2%. In 1998, the traffic
decreased at both ports. At DSM port, it decreased by 37.8% while at Mombasa port,
it decreased by 3.4%. However, the decrease did not contribute to a 3.9% decline in
the volume of dry cargo throughput at DSM port in 1998 as compared to 1991 because,
the volume of dry cargo from/to the country in 1998 was higher by 19.2% than in
1991.
The total dry cargo through the two ports had been positive from 1991 to 1996. In
1997 and 1998, it decreased. The average total growth rate is 16.9%. This portrays
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1997 and 1998. As Mc. William (January, 1998) reported, ``Uganda’s economy is
growing fast´´. From Appendix D1 and D2, it can also be observed that, Uganda’s
economy is growing. Between 1990 and 1995, the yearly average total GDP was 6.6%
while, between 1990 and 1997, it was 7.2%. Growth rates in Agriculture GDP and
Industry GDP had been positive too. Hence, its traffic generation is expected to grow.
Generally, Uganda’s cargo do not contribute to the declining dry cargo throughput at
Dar-Es-Salaam port.
Uganda’s main export commodity is Coffee and major import is oil. A larger part of
its cargo pass through Mombasa port because, transport infrastructure to the country is
better and distance is shorter. The distance to Kampala from Dar-Es-Salaam by rail via
lake Victoria is 1521 Kms while, the distance from Mombasa by road is 1170 Kms and
by rail via lake Victoria is 1242 Kms.
4.5.3

Dry Cargo Generation by Zambia and Malawi.

Dry cargo generated by these two countries which, are in the southern part of Tanzania
Table 23.

Dry Cargo from/to Zambia and Malawi throug DSM Port.
(in Metric tons)

Years

Zambia

1991

549.009

1992

939.386

71.1

145.309

-1.9

1.084.695

56.8

1993

664.101

-29.3

141.801

-2.4

805.902

-25.7

1994

526.624

-20.7

31.863

-77.5

558.487

-30.7

1995

422.733

-19.7

11.851

-62.8

434.584

-22.2

1996

298.638

-29.4

13.058

10.2

311.696

-28.3

1997

275.134

-7.9

9.006

-45.0

284.140

-8.8

1998

237.246

-13.8

5.572

-38.1

242.818

-14.5

Average

Trend %

Malawi

Trend %

142.606

-6.2

Total

Trend %

691.615

-26.7

-9.2

Source: DSM Port Statistics.

is shown in Table 23 and Figure 9. Table 23 and Figure 9 indicate that, the trend of
dry cargo from/to Zambia has been constantly declining from 1993 to 1998. The trend
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of Malawi cargo has also been constantly declining from 1992 to 1998 except in 1996.
In 1996, Malawi cargo increased by 10.2%. The average trends are, -6.2%, -26.7%
and –9.2% for Zambia cargo, Malawi cargo and total dry cargo respectively. These
declining trends are obvious contributing factors for the declining dry cargo throughput
at the port of Dar-Es-Salaam.

Dry
Dry Cargo
Cargofrom/to
from/toZambia
Zambiaand
andMalawi
Malawi through
throughDSM
DSMPort
Port

Tons
Tons
1000000
1000000
800000
800000
600000
600000
400000
400000
200000
200000
00
1991
1991

1992
1992

1993
1993

1994
1994

1995
1995

Zambia
Zambia

1996
1996

1997
1997

1998
1998

Malawi
Malawi

Figure 9.
Reasons for declining cargo from/to Zambia are as follows:
♦ Production of copper which is the country’s main export has decreased. In early
1990s, Zambia was producing 6000 tons of copper per year, now it is producing
3000 tons per year (Kinunda, A., official communication, 15/12/1999). This is
because, ores with copper have been exhausited.
♦ Competion from South African ports especially, the port of Durban. From 1994,
after the end of civil war in Mozambique and after the end of apartheid regime and
trade embargo against South Africa in 1993, competition has become severe. DSM
port is losing Zambian dry cargo to ports in southern part of Africa especially,
Durban port. In THA Corporate Strategy (1997/98-2000/2001) it is written that,
part of Zambia cargo is now passing through Durban because, of high frequency of
service at the port. Shippers from Zambia fail to meet vessels schedules at DSM
port due to long transit time to the port. Durban port besides its competitve
advantages explained in chapter three, it has a location advantage as explained
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under 4.3.2.2., Due to good overland connections with the port’s hinterland, travel
time from the port to the copper belt is shorter. It takes 7 days by road from the
copper belt to the port of Durban while it takes 10 days from the copper belt to
DSM port. Ocean freight from Europe to the port of Durban is cheaper than to
Dar-Es-Salaam port. For example, in 1998, freigth to DSM was 100 USD while,
freigth to Durban was 90 USD per TEU. The advantage of DSM port over ports in
South Africa and Mozambique is that, the distance from the port is shorter.
(Kinunda, A. 15/12/1999).
♦ The general performance of Zambia’s economy is poor. This can be observed from
Appendix D1. Between 1990 and 1995, its total GDP growth rate was 0.2% while,
between 1990 and 1997, it was –0.5%. The growth rates of Agricultural and
Industry are negative during the whole period. Looking at Appendix D2, it can be
noted that, in 1992, 1994, 1995 and 1998, the country’s GDP declined.
Reasons for declining dry cargo from/to Malawi are as follows:
♦ Like Zambia, after the end of civil war in Mozambique and after the end of trade
embargo against South Africa, DSM has lost Malawi cargo to the ports in the
southern part of Africa. The country’s traditional ports are Beira and Nacala in
Mozambique hence, the country has gone back to its traditional ports. Dry cargo at
Beira port is increasing. For example, in 1997, it increased by 11% over the
previous year. (Freight & Trading Weekly, 14/2/1997). Ports in Mozambique
have a distance advantage over DSM port.

The distance from the ports in

Mozambique to Malawi is shorter than the distnce from Dar-Es-Salaam port. The
distance from Durban port to Malawi is longer than from Mozambique ports and
DSM port. The comparison is shown in Table 24.
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Table 24.

Distance from Malawi Cities to DSM port,
Durban and Ports in Mozambique
Ports

Lilongwe

Blantyre

Dar-es-salaam

1594

1772

Durban via Zimbabwe & Zambia

3497

4085

Beira

1108

640

Nacala

389

807

Source: Chiwala, S. W. F. M. (1989).

Another advantage of the ports in Mozambique is that, there is better transport
connection between Beira port and Malawi than with Dar-Es-Salaam.

There is

railway and road tranport from Beira to Malawi while, from Dar-Es-Salaam to Malawi,
there is only road transport as a direct transport. In case railway transport is used,
cargo transfer from railway wagons to road transport has to be done in Mbeya.
Malawi, besides shifting its cargo to its traditional ports in Mozambique, part of its
cargo is now being transported through the port of Durban. It is reported that, 50% of
Malawi tobacco is exported through Durban (THA Corporate Strategy, 1996/972000/2001). Currently, only a few importers and exporters from the northern part of
Malawi are still using Dar-Es-Salaam port (Kinunda, A. personal communication,
15/12/1999).
Malawi’s economy is growing. Between 1990 and 1995, the average growth of its
total GDP was 0.7%. Growth in agriculture GDP was 1.7 while, that of Industry was
0.4%. Between 1990 and 1997, the growth rate of total GDP was 3.6. Growth rates in
Agriculture and Industry were 4.7% and 1.9% respectively (see Appendix D1).
Looking at Appendix D2 it can be observed that, the country’s economy is growing
except in 1994. The economic performance of the country was not a cause for the
declining dry cargo to/from the country through DSM port.
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4.6

Marketing Strategies Used by the Port and the Port Community

The aim of the marketing straregies is to make sure that, the port maintains its market
share despite the fact that, cargo is declining. The aim is also to increase the volume of
cargo where possible. The strategies the port uses include the following:
i.

Being close to the market.

The port believes that, the main strategy for

maintaining the market is being close to it. This is done through:
•

THA, TRC and NASAKO have established their marketing offices in Kampala.

•

In the southern market, they have established a Transport Co-odinating Committee
(TCC). This committee is comprised of members from Zambia, Malawi, Congo
and Tanzania.

Members from Tanzania include representatives from THA,

TAZARA, TRC and Customs. The committee meets every three months to discuss
about transport problems and development. Its objective is to ensure that, cargo
from these countries do not face transport bottleneck.
•

They visit the port’s major customers and try to find out their needs with the aim to
satisfy them.

•
ii.

They participate in the port’s customers’ annual trade fairs.
Monitoring of competition. The port monitors competition in order to find out
what competitors are doing so that, it can adjust itself accordingly. For example,
when competitors charge lower rates, they ajust their rates. However, sometimes,
efforts by the port to adjust itself so that it can maintain customers and attract others
is hampered by other players like overland transport operators, those responsible for
construction and maintainence of roads and the customs. For instance, when the
port adjusts its rates while railway transport and road transport operators do not
adjust theirs, adjustment of charges by the port becomes no much useful.

iii. The port has a tariff book however, its rates are negotiable.
iv.

An inland container depot for Uganda cargo is established at Ubungo.

v.

Through freight is established between the port and TRC.
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vi.

An inland dry port is established at Isaka for Burundi and Rwanda cargo

vii.

Representatives of the port community meet to discuss problems affecting their

customers and how to solve them.
4.7

Summary

From the analysis done in this chapter, it has been identified that, generally, Dar-EsSalaam port is not losing cargo to/from the Great Lakes countries to Mombasa port.
In 1991 and 1992, it lost some cargo to Mombasa port while, during the rest of the
years, there are occasional shifts of cargo from DSM to Mombasa and vice-versa.
However, more cargo from these countries except Burundi, pass through Mombasa
port because, of better transport infrastructure. The volume of dry cargo through the
port is declining because, the ability to generate cargo by Burundi, the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Rwanda is declining. Reasons for declining cargo volumes
from these countries are mainly war, political instability and poor economic
development. Dry cargo throughput at the port of Dar-Es-Salaam is declining because
of the declining cargo volumes from/to Zambia and Malawi too. Dry cargo from/to
these countries has been constantly declining. The declining volumes of dry cargo
from/to these countries is the main cause of the declining throughput at DSM port.
Dry cargo from/to Zambia is declining because, production of copper is reduced, the
coutry’s economic development is poor and some of its cargo is now passing through
the south African ports particularly, the port of Durban. Dry cargo from/to Malawi is
declining because, the country has shifted to its traditional ports in Mozambique and,
some of its cargo is passing through the port of Durban decline.
Dry cargo from/to Tanzania and Uganda through the port is increasing. Hence, these
countries do not contribute to the declining dry cargo throughput at Dar-Es-Salaam
port.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter

is

divided

into

two

main

parts

including

conclusion

and

recommendations. The conclusion part explains briefly, the aim of the research and
provides the findings of the research. The recommendations part gives suggestions on
what should be done in order to improve the trend of dry cargo throughput at Dar-EsSalaam port.
5.1

Conclusion

The trend of dry cargo throughput at DSM port has been declining, this study aimed at
finding out the contributing factors to the decline. Two factors were thought to be the
possible causes of the declining throughput.
i.

Poor quality of service at the port, making it lose cargo to its competitors.

ii.

Poor ability of the port’s hinterland to generate dry cargo.

The analysis done in this dissertation aimed at proving whether, these two possible
factors are actually contributing to the declining dry cargo throughput at the port or
not. Based on the analysis, the following conclusions are drawn from the research:
1. The quality of service in terms of productivity, ship time in port, container dwell
time, cargo security and customer service at the port is poor that is, the services
provided at the port can not satisfy the port’s customers.
2. The quality of service at the port of DSM is more or less the same to the qualiy of
service at Mombasa port. This being the case, the port is not losing cargo to the
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port of Mombasa. However, more dry cargo from and to DRC and Rwanda is
passing through the port of Mombasa despite the fact that, the DSM route offers
single border crossing and shorter distances. This is because, Mombasa route’s
transport infrastructure is better. More Uganda dry cargo is also passing through
Mombasa port because, of the route’s better transport infrastructure and its distance
is shorter.
3. The quality of service at the port of DSM is very low compared to the quality of
service at the port of Durban. This being the case together with other advantages
of Durban port like high frequency of shipping services, DSM port is losing
Zambia and Malawi dry cargo to the port of Durban despite the fact that, DSM
route offers single border crossing and shorter distances. Dry cargo from and to
these countries is declining every year at high rates, the decline is the main cause of
the declining dry cargo throughput at DSM port.
4. The trend of Zambia dry cargo through the port of Dar-Es-Salaam is also declining
because, the country’s ability to generate dry cargo especially copper which, is its
main export commodity has decreased. However, Zambia is still the second largest
user of the port.
5. The trends of cargo from and to Burundi, DRC and Rwanda through DSM port and
the port of Mombasa are declining. Hence, dry cargo throughput at DSM port is
declining because, the ability of this part of its hinterland to generate the cargo is
decreasing.
6. The volumes of dry cargo from and to Tanzania and Uganda are increasing.
Hence, they do not contribute to the declining dry cargo throughput at DSM port.
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5.2

Recommendations

The marketing efforts which are being undertaken by the port of Dar-Es-Salaam are
appreciated. In additional to what is being done in order to maintain the port’s market
share, the following recommendations should also be implemented.
1.

Improvement of the quality of service

The port should improve the quality of service in order to ensure that, it does not lose
cargo to its competitors. Improvement of the quality of service is also imperative for
attracting more cargo to the port. The following should be done in order to improve
the performance:
i.

The port and the port community workers should change their attitudes towards
customers. They should be educated about the importance to please customers.
Policy on this, Malta Free Port company is a good example (see 2.3.5). All
empolyees from the top to the bottom should be made aware that, their port’s
and their own survival depend on the availability of customers. They should
also be made aware that, most of their customers are not captive customers,
they have alternative ports which they can shift to, if they are not treated well.
They should internalise the following words which, were said by Osman, M.
S. (The Port of Tanjung Pelepas Booklet):

ii.



Customers are our priority.



Discipline, Knowledge and performance are our strengths.



Working is our joy.



Caring and Humility is our character.

Equipment with high productivity should be acquired.

With this kind of

equipment, productivity and ship turn-round time will improve. Consequently,
the port will be able to maintain its customers and attract more.These
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improvements will attract mordern ships to call at the port which, will lead to
further improvements in productivity.
iii.


Waiting time should be reduced by doing the following:
Proper planning and requisition of shore handling equipment. The equipment
should be ready at the quay before a shift starts. This will eliminate waiting time
for equipment.



Consignees and shippers should be informed in advance on the time when their
cargo will be discharged or loaded so that, lorries will be at the port to pick up
cargo and, cargo will be at the port for loading in ships at the right times. In case
this can not be easily achieved, direct delivery and receipt should be avoided.
Cargo should pass through short-term storage. This will minimize waiting time for
lorries and cargo.



The port should explore the possibility of covering some of the berths like what
has been done by the weather proof cargo handling company at the port of
Amsterdam (see 2.3.9). This will enable cargo loading and discharging to be done
under any kind of weather.

iv.


Cargo dwell time should be reduced by doing the following:
A possibility to simplify cargo documentation and clearance procedure should be
looked at. A detailed study of the documents’ contents and the clearance procedure
should be done so that, improvements can be developed.



Establish one place and only one place for documents clearance. All officials
responsible for cargo clearance should be in the same house. This will facilitate
quicker clearance of cargo documents.



The port should move to a third generation port. It should introduce an Electronic
Data Interchange system (EDI). Cargo tracing and monitoring should be done by
softwares and the use of computers. This will facilitate quicker communication
among all responsible parties for cargo documents clearance.
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Time allocated for processing cargo documents clearance should be increased. It
should be done from 8:00 to 5:00. The problem of security of cash money can be
solved by using cheques and credit cards for payments.



Verification of cargo by customs should not be done by 100%. As a short-term
solution, it should be done at random to about 50% . Those who will be found to
have cheated about the particulars of their cargo should be severely punished. A
high fine should be set.

In case the fine can not be paid, cargo should be

confiscated and auctioned. Officials who will be found to be colluding with
consignees who cheat, should be expelled from work. As a long-term solution, a
computerised customs clearance system should be applied.


Higher storage charges than the charges in other storages in the city should be set
by the port. This will help to discourage consignees to leave their cargo at the port
for a long time. Cargo which is not collected after the grace period should be
moved to a long-term storage.

v.

Cargo security should be improved by use of cameras and computers to control

and monitor the movement of cargo in stores and yards.
2.
i.

Other Marketing Strategies
The port community shoud lobby to the government for transport infrastrucure
improvement. The government should always be reminded about the effects of
poor state of the infrastructure to the port and the economy as a whole.

ii.

The Government should be in a fore front to appeal to the international
community to facilitate the achievement of peace in the war torne hinterland of
the port.

iii.

Tanzania Harbours Authority should advocate for establishment of a tea
auction in Dar-Es-Salaam. This will help to attract tea exports from Rwanda.
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iv.

The port should apply CRM (see 2.2.3). It should establish a close relationship
with its main customers The port should strive for satisfying special needs of
each of its main customers.

•

The port should encourage establishment of value added activities at the port by
importers and exporters like packaging and repackaging, assembly of cars, crating
and establishment of distribution centres. This will help to maintain customers at
the port.

•

The port and the port community should have quality assurance committees. The
committees should include the port’s main customers like what is done at Sea
Malta Company (see 2.3.8).

•

Some major customers of the port should be included in the Board of Directors of
the port and others should be involved in joint consultation meetings.

•

The port officials should continuosly carry out market research to find out
developments in the market, who are decision makers for choice of ports and what
influences their decisions. The port should be innovative, proactive and be able to
quickly respond according to the needs of the market.

If all these will be implemented together with improved quality of service, improved
transport infrastructure and transit times, Dar-Es-Salaam port will be able to attract
more customers and improve its trend of dry cargo throughput. Otherwise, the trend of
dry cargo throughput at the port will become worse. Cargo from/to the landlocked
countries will pass through south African ports particularly, the port of Durban. Cargo
will not go to DSM port.

Without improvement in the transport infrastructure,

Mombasa port will continue to have a larger share of the market than, DSM port.
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APPENDIX A
Questions for Dar-Es-Salaam Port Officials.

1. What is your dry cargo throughput for the past eight years?

2. What is your port’s annual dry cargo capacity?

3. What is the your performance for the past eight years (various dry cargo
performance indicators)?

4. What is the hinterland of the port?

5.

What are your competing ports?

6. What is the trend of your market share?

7. What are your competitive strengths in relation to your rival ports?

8. Are there any customers complaints about the quality of your services and cargo
security? What is the amount of losses and damages?

9. What are your marketing strategies?
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APPENDIX B

Holding/Pending Claims in ‘000 TShs at Dar-Es-Salaam Port.
January-June, 1998.
Claims

January

February

March

April

May

June

Average

Claims for

246.020

233.029

233.029

233.029

233.029

240.978

236.519

settlement

(410.033

(3 88.381

(388.381

(388.381

(388.38

(401.630

(394.198

USD)

USD)

USD)

1 USD)

USD)

USD)

handling
Stage

USD)
Claims for

14.685

14.685

14.685

14.685

14.685

14.685

14.685

payment

(24.475

(24.475

(24.475

(24.475

(24.475

(24.475

(24.475

approval

USD)

USD)

USD)

USD)

USD)

USD)

USD)

Claims

227.883

149.721

149.721

205.759

205.759

206.774

199.269

awaiting

(379805

(249.535

(249.535

(342.931

(342.93

(344.623

(332.115

response

USD)

USD)

USD)

USD)

1 USD)

USD)

USD)

from oper.
Depart.
Claims still

443.942

433.942

416.817(

436.849

452.478

425.488

434.920

under

(739.903

(739.903

694.695

(728.081

(754.13

(709.146

(724.866

USD)

USD)

USD)

0 USD)

USD)

USD)

investigation

USD)

Source: DSM Port Commercial Department.
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APPENDIX C
Claims in ‘000 KShs Arising from Missing Cargo at Mombasa Port
Claims brought

Claims lodged in

Claims paid in

forward from 1997

1998

35.105 KShs

99.274 KShs

67.103 KShs

61.761 KShs

(583.508 USD)

(1.650.457 USD)

(1.117.935 USD)

(1.117.935 USD)

1998

Source: KPA Annual Bulletin, 1998.
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Claim declined as
At 31/12/1998

APPENDIX D1
Percentage Change in Economic Growth
1990 to 1995
COUNTRIES

GDP

1990 to 1997

ADDED VALUE
Agriculture

Industry

ADDED VALUE

GDP

Agriculture

Industry

Burundi

-2.3

-4.1

-5.0

-3.7

-2.8

-8.0

DRC

-0.6

-0.9

1.2

-6.6

3.0

-15.9

Malawi

0.7

1.7

0.4

3.6

4.7

1.9

Rwanda

-12.8

-10.8

-17.0

1.7

Tanzania

3.2

4.1

8.4

Uganda

6.6

3.8

4.0

7.2

3.8

13.0

Zambia

0.2

1.7

0.4

3.6

4.7

1.9

-

-

-

-

-

Source: World Bank Development Reports, 1997 and 1998/99

APPENDIX D2
GDP in Million Dollars Constant 1995 Prices
Country

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Burundi

1.169

1.177

1.110

1.076

1.000

0.914

0.918

0.959

DRC

8.457

7.569

6.549

6.294

6.338

6.281

5.923

6.101

Rwanda

1.973

2.089

1.919

0.969

1.326

1.486

1.648

1.813

Zambia

3.503

3.442

3.677

3.550

3.470

3.695

3.822

3.746

Tanzania

4.664

4.249

4.768

4.834

4.958

5.160

5.367

5.552

Uganda

4.330

4.478

5.851

5.161

6.756

6.278

6.576

6.944

Malawi

1.400

1.297

1.423

1.277

1.465

1.621

1.703

1.755

Source: World Bank Development Reports
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APPENDIX E

Stevedoring, Wharfage and Storage Charges (1996) at DSM, Mombasa
and Durban Port (For High Value Goods)
Cargo
1. Containers
(DSM port)

2. Dry Break-Bulk
(DSM port)
1. Containers
(Durban port)
2. Dry Break-Bulk
(Durban port)
1. Containers
(Mombasa port)

2. Dry Break-Bulk
(Mombasa port)

Stevedoring

Wharfage

20ft : USD 80
40ft : USD 120

Imports:
20ft : USD 240
40ft : USD 480
Exports:
20ft : USD 200
40ft : USD 400
Imports:
USD 14/HT
Exports:
USD 12/HT

USD 5/HT

20ft: USD 67
40ft: USD 100
USD 7/HT
20ft: USD 100
40ft: USD 120

USD 5/HT

Imports/Exports
20ft: USD 30
40ft: USD 60
USD 1.5/HT

USD 20/TEU
USD 1/HT

N/A
N/A

Imports.
20ft: USD 150
40ft: USD 180
Exports:
20ft: USD 100
40ft: USD 120
Imports/exports
USD 8/HT

Source: DSM, Durban and Mombasa port’s Tariff books (1996).
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Storage
Charges/Day

USD 1/HT

